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Abstract
This thesis consists of two essays concerning how banking regulations may promote
financial stability. The first chapter investigates the competition-concentration-
stability nexus from a novel perspective, by considering how concentration and, inter
alia competition, affect the likelihood of an individual bank failing, and the likeli-
hood of the bank failure spreading contagiously to the rest of the banking system.
Competition is shown to reduce individual bank and systemic stability by reducing
banks’ profit buffers to absorb liquidity shocks. The impact of concentration on sta-
bility is more nuanced however, as increased concentration increases banks’ profit
buffers but also increases the concentration risk in the interbank market, widen-
ing the channel of contagion by which a liquidity shock can spread throughout the
network. The second chapter concerns optimal ex-ante prudential regulation and
ex-post resolution policy of globally systemically important banks. It characterises
the conditions under which weakly capitalised, limitedly liable banks have incentives
to ’gamble for resurrection’ by investing in risky asset portfolios, in the knowledge
that the downside risk is shifted onto the deposit insurance fund. In this context
it is shown that a bank resolution by ‘bailing in’ unsecured debt holders can re-
store the incentive for banks to act prudently, and that the bail-in should occur
above the point of insolvency to ensure the bank has sufficient skin in the game.
The interplay of three ex-ante prudential regulatory instruments is analysed: the
minimum capital and total loss absorbing capacity requirements and the minimum
capital buffer. The minimum capital and TLAC requirements are set to ensure that
the bank has sufficient skin in the game to invest prudently and tradeoff the ex-post
costs of bailing in unsecured debt holders, the cost of bailing out depositors and the
cost of equity issuance, and minimum equity buffer is set to ensure an appropriate
trigger for resolution.
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Chapter 1
Competition, Concentration and
Contagion
1.1 Introduction
The ”competition-concentration-stability nexus” which is the relationship between
competition, concentration and stability in the banking industry has received re-
newed research interest in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008. This relationship
has become particularly important as competition rules were relaxed during the fi-
nancial crisis to stabilise banks by facilitating mergers, and in the EU an exemption
in state aid rules was applied, which allows EU member states to use state resources
to assist failing banks to prevent a serious disturbance in the economy. A number of
observers have questioned whether developments in the state of competition in the
banking industry such as the financial liberalisation in the 1970s or the recent con-
solidation in the banking sector have made the financial system more or less fragile.
For example the UK Secretary of State approved the merger of HBOS and Lloyds
TSB on advice from the UK prudential regulatory authorities that it was necessary
to maintain financial stability, despite the UK competition authority (the OFT) ob-
jecting to the merger on the grounds of a material reduction in competition. Vickers
(2010) reviewed this case and argued that ”it would appear to have been a mistake
to waive normal merger law to address the HBOS problem once it was clear, as it
was by early October 2008, that a systemic solvency problem existed. Relaxation
of competition law was not a good way to help financial stability in this case, and
as the subsequent problems of LBG have shown, it may have worsened it.”
A review of the history of banking regulation highlights that regulators’ views on
the relationship between competition, concentration and stability have evolved over
time. Following the great depression in the 1930s, there was a view held in a num-
ber of advanced economies that there is a tradeoff between the benefits of greater
competition promoting greater allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency and
ultimately social welfare, versus the costs associated with an increased likelihood
of bank failure. This led competition authorities to protect a highly concentrated
banking industry with lower intensity of competition. For example, in the US the
banking industry was exempt from the application of antitrust policy until the 1960s,
and the European Commission did not apply competition policy in the banking sec-
6
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tor until the early 1980s. The regulations in place in the period following the great
depression until the period of liberalisation in the 1970s and 1980s suggest that
regulators at the time held the ’competition-fragility’ and ’concentration-stability’
views. Since the 1970s it appears that these views have become less prevalent, as
a period of deregulation reduced bank industry concentration and increased com-
petition from domestic and foreign banks and other non-bank financial institutions.
Following the entry and expansion of new banks in the 1980s and 1990s, there has
been an increase in concentration resulting from a number of domestic and cross-
border mergers in Europe and the US. There have been further increases in banking
industry concentration since the onset of the financial crisis beginning in 2008 as, in
order to allow banks to weather the crisis, a number of countries and the European
Commission have relaxed competition policy and state aid rules by bailing out banks
and permitting, and in some case forcing, the takeover of weak banks by larger banks
with stronger balance sheets. Thus it appears that the ’concentration-stability’ and
’competition-fragility’ views have returned to the favour of regulators.
There is no consensus in theoretical and empirical academic literature on the effect
of competition or concentration on financial stability. There are two opposing views
on the nature of the relationship: there is the ’competition-fragility’ view that more
intense competition makes banks more fragile, and the ’competition stability’ view
that greater competition promotes greater stability of the banking system. Similarly
there are ’concentration stability’ and ’concentration fragility’ views that increased
concentration increases and reduces stability in the banking industry, respectively.
In order to design an appropriate ex-ante competition framework for the banking
industry an understanding of the relationship between competition, concentration
and stability is key. If there is a tradeoff between the benefits of greater competition
or reduced concentration in terms of promoting efficiency versus the costs of reducing
stability then there is a need for competition authorities and prudential regulators
to coordinate, for example to fully understand the ramifications of approving a
proposed merger between two banks.
Post-crisis regulatory reform has aimed at increasing the resilience of individual
banks to adverse shocks, but also has a greater focus on promoting systemic sta-
bility. A systemic banking crisis according to the ’narrow’ definition adopted by
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), is a situation in which the failure of one financial
institution “leads in a sequential fashion to considerable adverse effects on one or
several other financial institutions or markets, e.g. their failure or crash“. This def-
inition includes crises in which financial distress in one bank spreads contagiously
to others, but excludes situations in which banks are hit by a common shock such
as poor macroeconomic fundamentals affecting highly correlated asset portfolio re-
turns. Systemic banking crises are of particular interest to policymakers as there
is a need to ensure that the continuity of the special role performed by banks in
providing credit to the real economy, whereas the failure of a single, isolated bank
should not cause major disruption to the economy as the failed bank’s customers
may switch to use one of the surviving banks. To understand how competition af-
fects the incidence of banking crises, and in particular systemic crises the effect of
changes in competition on the likelihood of contagion needs to be considered. Based
on these observations the questions we seek to answer in this paper are the following:
1. What is the effect of reduced concentration on systemic stability in the banking
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industry?
2. What is the effect of increased competition on systemic stability in the banking
industry?
We distinguish between concentration and competition as the ”structure conduct
performance” paradigm which predicts a strong negative relationship between con-
centration and intensity of competition has been rejected in empirical literature. As
Vives (2016) notes analysis of competition in the banking industry is complicated
by the existence of a number of significant market failures including imperfect infor-
mation, market power and externalities. Entry barriers into the traditional banking
industry are high in part due to the high costs of establishing a branch network,
building up a reputation for solvency and establishing a customer base, but also
due to regulatory barriers such as the requirements to have in place appropriate
risk management systems and meet prudential capital requirements. Nevertheless,
concentration measures such as the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI)1 cannot
explain competitive outcomes alone. Banking markets are contestable to a certain
degree as regulatory liberalisation has lead to banks facing competition, particularly
in recent years from Fintech competitors which have disrupted the status quo in a
number of banking markets.
In line with the above discussion we distinguish between the effect of competition and
inter alia concentration on stability.2 ’Concentration’ is measured by the number
of equally sized banks N , so a concentrated banking industry is one with a small
number of banks. ’Competition’ is defined as the intensity of competition between
banks for a given level of concentration, and is determined by a parameter d which
measures how much depositors value the specific banking services and other non-
price product characteristics including physical locations of branches. The more
depositors value these non-price product characteristics, the less competitive the
market is i.e. the more banks will be able to exploit market power by offering lower
deposit rates to depositors.
In answering the research questions posed above we aim to establish the magnitude,
and more importantly the direction of any causal relationship from increased con-
centration or reduced intensity of competition on the incidence of systemic banking
crises. To answer these questions we first review the relevant literature. The review
highlights that theoretical banking crisis models typically assume perfect competi-
tion or monopoly in the banking sector, and thus do not provide an answer to the
research questions above. The theoretical and empirical literature which focuses
specifically on the relationship between competition and stability provides a rather
mixed picture, and few of these papers considered the effect of competition on sys-
temic, rather than individual bank stability. To examine the relationship in theory
we introduce imperfect competition in the Allen and Gale (2000) model of contagion
1HHI is equal the sum of the squares of all banks market shares. It is bounded between 0
(indicating perfect competition) and 1 (indicating monopoly).
2Note that the potential effect of competition on concentration and vice-versa are outside of
the scope of the paper. Whilst it could be argued that as banks face increased competition
from Fintech firms the endogenous response of the banking industry could be to consolidate to
preserve profitability. The focus of this paper is rather to understand from a static perspective
how competition and concentration affect financial stability, without analysing how bank industry
structure may evolve.
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through interbank markets. The modified model suggests that whereas an increase
in industry concentration provides banks with a profit buffer which they can use to
serve their depositors in the event of an increase of liquidity demand increasing the
likelihood of contagion, it also broadens the channel of contagion through the inter-
bank market meaning that there are two opposing effects of increased concentration
on stability.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper bridges literature on financial contagion, and the literature on the rela-
tionship between competition, concentration and stability.
Literature on financial contagion shows how an idiosyncratic shock which causes
the failure of one bank can be propagated to other banks, threatening the stability
of the entire banking system. Transmissions channels put forward in the literature
include idiosyncratic bank failures triggering a firesale of assets an environment
of limited liquidity resulting in the asset price falling below its fundamental value
(Diamond and Rajan (2011)), the failure of bank acting as a ‘wakeup call’ to other
investors by revealing information on the vulnerability of banks with correlated asset
portfolios (Chen (1999)) and connections through the interbank deposits (Allen
and Gale (2000)). This literature typically assumes perfect competition so that
the equilibrium deposit contract maximises depositor utility subject to the bank’s
resource constraints, and thus does not address the question of how competition and
concentration affect the likelihood of financial contagion.
A number of papers have considered the effect of competition in the interbank
market on stability. Allen and Gale (2004) show firms with market power in the
interbank market have an incentive to provide liquidity to distressed banks in order
to avoid contagion. On the other hand Acharya et al (2012) show that banks may
strategically refuse to lend to distressed banks in order to induce the distressed bank
to sell assets at fire sale prices and to increase market share. These papers focus
on whether there are strategic gains from supplying or refusing to supply liquidity
to rival banks in the event of a crisis. In contrast to these papers, we assume that
the interbank lending rates are fixed ex-ante as in Allen and Gale (2000), and focus
rather on how changes in industry structure affect concentration risk and profit
buffers as discussed in section 1.3 below.
A separate body of literature which focuses specifically on how competition af-
fects stability. Broadly speaking, it can be divided into two opposing views. The
”charter-value” view proposed by Keeley (1990) states that increased competition
erodes a bank’s charter value (i.e. the net present value of future profits from
keeping its charter), which reduces the opportunity cost if the bank goes bankrupt
(i.e. it lowers the bank’s skin in the game) and thus incentivises bank managers to
hold a more risky asset portfolio. The charter value view assumes that banks can
choose the riskiness of their asset portfolios. By contrast the ’risk-shifting’ view of
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) assumes that risk is chosen by the borrower, so that
greater competition in the loan market results which reduces interest rates will in-
crease profits for debtor firms, and in turn incentivise firms to reduce risk, reducing
Chapter 1 John Vourdas 9
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defaults and banking crises, meaning that greater competition is associated with
greater stability. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) show that if loans defaults
are imperfectly correlated then increased competition has two counteracting effects
on financial stability: it decreases interest rates, decreasing the riskiness of loans,
however it also increases the margin on loans which do not default giving the bank
a greater buffer against losses. This yields a more subtle inversed U-shaped rela-
tionship between competition and stability, in which if competition is weak then the
risk-shifting effect dominates so that increased competition undermines stability,
whereas if competition is intense, increasing competition increases stability as the
margin effect dominates.
There are two key contributions this paper makes to the literature on the competition-
concentration-stability nexus. Firstly, we analyse the impact of bank industry struc-
ture on systemic stability whereas extant literature examines the effect on the like-
lihood of an individual bank failing, abstracting from potential contagion effects.3
Secondly, to the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to separately analyse
the effect of concentration, and competition on financial stability. The majority of
papers use the number of banks as a proxy of competition, or in the case of Kee-
ley (1990) they use a measure of competition (Tobin’s q) and do not consider the
potential interaction between the two. In contrast, by utilising a model of bank-
ing competition which incorporates parameters for both the number of banks and
the intensity of competition for a given number of banks, we are able to separately
identify the effect of competition and inter alia concentration on financial stability.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Outline
The starting point of the model outlined below is the seminal paper by Allen and
Gale (2000), hereafter ’AG’, on financial contagion through the inter-bank deposit
market. This model provides a parsimonious framework in which to analyse the
effects of competition on the likelihood of contagion and systemic crises. We extend
the model in two ways. Firstly, we introduce imperfect competition in the market
for depositors, which gives banks a profit buffer which they can use to serve early
depositors in the event of a liquidity shortage. Secondly, we extend the model be-
yond the four banks example given in the original paper to highlight how greater
competition may spread risk across banks, stabilising the banking system. These
modifications introduce a potential tradeoff in the relationship between concentra-
tion and stability, as higher concentration (equivalently a lower number of banks)
means that banks are less able to diversify risk in the interbank market, but enjoy
3Freixas and Ma (2015) analyse how competition affects systemic risk, in addition to the effect
on portfolio, liquidity and insolvency risk. They find that competition reduces banks’ profit buffer
against loses, but also reduces solvency risk in part of the parameter space. In contrast to the
present paper which models financial contagion as an equilibrium outcome of profit maximising
banks, Freixas and Ma (2015) simply analyse a 2 bank model and assume that the loss in asset
value in a firesale is greater if both banks fail, without explicitly modelling equilibrium in the
market for assets during a firesale.
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larger profits which can be used as a buffer with which to serve customers in the
event of a run.
1.3.2 Environment
There are three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. There is a single good and a continuum of
identical depositors normalised to unity, which are endowed with a single unit of the
good at date t = 0. Depositors learn at period 1 whether they are an ’early type’
which value consumption in period 1 only, or a ’late type’ which value consumption
in period 2 only. There is no discounting.
As in AG banks compete by offering contracts which promises depositors a fixed
amount c1 at t = 1 if the depositor is an early type or c2 at t = 2 if the depositor is
a late type, in exchange for the depositor’s unit endowment at t=0. Each depositor
deposits her unit endowment at a single bank, and the probability of being an early
type is known by all agents in period 0.
We depart from the AG framework by assuming that the market for deposit contracts
is imperfectly competitive.4 Banks are assumed to be horizontally differentiated in
the depositor market ala the Salop (1979) ’circular city’ spatial model of competi-
tion.5 In this model depositors tastes’ are represented by their location on a circle
of unitary circumference, and the continuum of depositors is uniformly distributed
around the circle. Banks are assumed to be maximally horizontally differentiated,
so that given N banks, each bank is located a distance 1/N from each of its two
closest neighbours.6
The locations of banks and depositors on the unit circle have a natural interpretation
of their location in physical space. However as in Salop (1979), locations may also be
interpreted as the banks’ and depositors’ locations in characteristics space reflecting
other non-price characteristics of the services offered by the bank, and preferred by
the depositor respectively. Horizontal differentiation in the bank depositor market
may take various forms. For example, banks may provide different combinations of
4For tractability, we follow the assumptions employed by AG by assuming that the deposit
contract offered to other banks in the interbank market is the same as the equilibrium {c1, c2}
offered to regular depositors. If we assume instead that there is a separate market for interbank
deposits which is perfectly competitive then banks still optimally hold deposits in all other banks so
the channel of contagion is unchanged and as the interbank deposit flows net to zero in expectation
the expected profits of the bank are also unchanged meaning that the results of this paper are
insensitive to this assumption .
5Note that this model has been used to model competition in the banking industry by a number
of other authors including Friexas and Rochet (2008) and Cordella and Yayati (2002). Further
note that Degryse and Ongena (2005) find some empirical support for spatial discrimination in
loan pricing which is consistent with the view that as banks become closer in physical and other
characteristics space market power falls.
6Note that banks do not decide on their location in this model, so their competition will take the
form of a static game taking place in period 0 in which banks simultaneously decided on the optimal
deposit contract and investment portfolio. Economides (1989) derives maximal differentiation as
an equilibrium phenomenon by formulating a three stage game in which firms decide whether or not
to enter, choose a location of the unit circle, and compete in prices, assuming quadratic transport
costs.
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ancillary services or have different brand identities which depositors have different
tastes for.
The number of banks N is determined by the banking regulator which issues charters
which permit banks to operate, so the number of banks is exogenously specified
rather than specifying a fixed entry cost and determining the number of banks being
determined endogenously by a condition that the number of the banks is equal to
the number such that further entry is no longer profitable i.e. a zero net profit
condition. This ensures that the model captures two key features of the banking
industry: limited entry due to licensing and strictly positive profits. For example in
the UK when Metrobank opened in 2010 it was the first new high-street bank to be
issued a bank charter in over 150 years, however changes in industry concentration
have also taken place more recently through merger and acquisition activity.
A parameter d measures the ”transport cost” which is incurred by each depositor to
move from her location on the unit circle to the bank. This parameter measures the
intensity of competition for a given level of concentration. Market power is increasing
in d, and in the limit in which the transport cost is zero banks have no market power
and the contract offered is the first best contract offered in AG. The introduction
of internet banking in the 2000s may have reduced this transport cost parameter d
as depositors do not need to physically visit branches so often. More generally, the
competition parameter d may also be interpreted as a proxy for competition for a
given level of industry concentration. For example, the liberalisation of the banking
industry in the 1980s and 1990s and the growth of shadow banks which do not have
a banking license but offer deposit-like services, or Fintech firms, which compete
with banks in other markets, may erode banks’ profit margins even if the number
of banks is unchanged.
Depositor i incurs ’transport costs’ to travel from her location li to the bank j’s
location lj in order to deposit its unit endowment at that bank. As discussed above
the locations reflect the locations in characteristics space, and therefore the transport
cost d|li − lj| reflects the depositors’ disutility from depositing at a bank which offers
a package of services (which may include physical bank locations) which are different
from the depositors preferred package. In period 0 the expected utility of a depositor
i of a deposit contract with bank j is given by
uji = λu(c
j
1) + (1− λ)u(cj2)− d|li − lj| (1.1)
where λ is the probability of being an early type, the deposit contract of bank
j offers (cj1, c
j
2), u() is a twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave
instantaneous utility function, d is the ’transport cost’ and li and lj are the locations
of depositor i and bank j respectively.
Depositors choose the deposit contract which maximises their expected utility so
a depositor i which is located at a distance m ∈ (0, 1/N) away from bank j is
indifferent between banks j and the other closest bank k if the following condition
holds
uj − dm = uk − d(1/N −m) (1.2)
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where m = |li − lj| and uj = λu(cj1) + (1− λ)u(cj2) and uk = λu(ck1) + (1− λ)u(ck2).
Re-arranging (1.2) and noting that as bank has two immediate neighbours and due
to symmetry the demand is equal to 2m so the demand curve is given by:
D = 2m =
uj − uk
d
+
1
N
(1.3)
At t = 0 banks can invest the unit of good they receive from each depositor in
two assets: the short asset (y) which is a simple storage technology which has a
gross return of one unit after one period, and the long asset (x) which yields a
return R > 1 after two periods, and yields a return r < 1 if liquidated after one
period. So each bank faces a per-depositor feasibility constraint of x + y ≤ 1.
Given that the assets both yield a positive return it is clear that this constraint
is binding, so that the long asset holdings of the bank can therefore be written as
x = 1 − y. Substituting this directly into the bank’s objective function the bank’s
maximisation problem can be written as the following. The objective function (1.4)
is the industry profit function multiplied the bank j’s market share. Equations (1.5)
and (1.6) are the resource constraints for serving early depositors at time t = 1 and
late depositors at time t = 2 respectively. Note that at time t = 1 the bank serves
its early depositors with the liquid asset y and at time t = 2 the bank serves its late
depositors with the illiquid asset x which has return R. The final constraint (1.7)
is an incentive compatibility constraint which ensures that late types are weakly
better off by revealing their true type rather pretending they are early types and
withdrawing early. As u′(c2) ≥ u′(c1) the incentive compatibility constraint is also
satisfied.
max
{cj1,cj2,yj}
Π =
(
yj +R(1− yj)− λcj1 − (1− λ)cj2
)(uj − uk
d
+
1
N
)
(1.4)
subject to
λcj1 ≤ yj (1.5)
(1− λ)cj2 ≤ R(1− yj) (1.6)
cj1 ≤ cj2 (1.7)
The derivation of the optimal deposit contract and asset portfolio is shown in Ap-
pendix A.1. Note as the problem is symmetric the deposit contract and investment
portfolio is the same for all bank so that {cj1, cj2, yj} = {c1, c2, y}∀j = 1, 2...N . We
assume a logarithmic utility function u(c) = log(c) for tractability and for ease of
comparison of results with AG. This yields an optimal contract in which c1 = Rc2 so
the incentive compatibility constraint (1.7) is not binding. This yields the following
deposit contract {c∗1, c∗2} and asset portfolio {x∗, y∗}:
(c∗1, c
∗
2, x
∗, y∗) =
(
N
N + d
,
RN
N + d
,
N +Nd−Nλ
N + d
,
λN
N + d
)
(1.8)
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In the limit as the number of banks becomes large (N →∞), or as depositors care
less about bank location (d → 0) then the late consumptions approaches the first-
best outcome in which profits are zero, and the special case of perfect competition
assumed by AG is obtained i.e. limN→∞{c∗1, c∗2} = limd→0{c∗1, c∗2} = {1, R}. Due to
symmetry each bank has an equal market share and has demand of 1/N so the total
profit of each bank is given by:
Π∗ =
1
N
[y +R(1− y)− λc1 − (1− λ)c2] = Rd
N2 +Nd
(1.9)
1.3.3 Interbank deposits and network structure.
This subsection explains that in the model banks are subject to regional liquidity
shocks such that they have excess demand for liquidity in one state, and excess
supply of liquidity in another state. In order to provide the second best allocation
in (1.8) above banks hold interbank deposit banks in interconnected banks. The
interbank holdings of banks serve as a conduit through which crises can spread
contagiously from one bank to other banks.
There are N banks. In non-crisis states 1 and 2 the liquidity demands of odd
banks (i.e. banks 1,3,5,...) are negatively correlated with those of even banks, as
summarised in Table 1.1. Liquidity shocks are bank, rather than depositor-specific
which results in banks optimally holding their deposits in a greater number of banks,
meaning that an increase in the number of banks dilutes the impact of potential
losses due to an interconnected bank failing.
The total liquidity in the system is constant in both these states, so there are id-
iosyncratic liquidity shocks but no aggregate shocks. There is a third crisis state S¯
which occurs with a zero probability, but given that the probability of the state oc-
curring is zero banks do not factor this state into their interbank holdings decisions.
That state is discussed in the following subsection, and the rest of this subsection
considers the optimal interbank deposit holdings.
Table 1.1 – Banks’ Liquidity Shocks
State Bank 1 Other Odd Banks Even banks
1 λH λH λL
2 λL λL λH
S¯ λ+  λ λ
Banks can exchange interbank deposits at t = 0. The payoffs of these interbank
deposits are the same as those for retail depositors, so 1 unit of interbank deposit
returns c1 if withdrawn at t = 1 and c2 if withdrawn at t = 2. Arbitrage oppor-
tunities ensure that retail depositors and other banks are offered the same deposit
contract.
AG consider a number of different networks structures for inter-bank borrowing.
Firstly, they consider a complete network structure in which every bank is directly
connected with every other bank. Secondly, they consider an incomplete network
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structure in which each bank holds deposits in one other bank only, but all banks
are directly or indirectly linked to each other. Finally they consider separated in-
complete networks in which each bank can only borrow from one other bank in the
interbank market the banks are not all (directly or indirectly) connected with each
other.
The issue of endogenous network formation is outside of the focus of this paper.
Instead we assume a complete network structure, as we wish to capture the possi-
bility that in a less concentrated banking industry (i.e. with a greater number of
equally sized banks) risk of contagion through interbank deposits is smaller as in-
terbank deposits are spread over a larger number of connected banks, thus reducing
the impact of the failure of a single rival bank on a bank’s stability. The structure
is also analagous to a ’hub and spoke’ network structure in which a large number of
atomistic banks only participate in the interbank deposit network through a larger
regional ’hub’, which is itself in a complete market structure with all other large
hub banks, which are themselves each connected to a large number of atomistic
banks, and all banks within the region are perfectly (positively) correlated within
the region, and perfectly (negatively) correlated across odd and even regions.
In AG, given N banks in a complete network structure each bank holds interbank
deposits in the other N−1 banks. This entails banks are holding interbank deposits
in all other banks (which are equal in size by symmetry), so that odd banks hold
deposits in other odd banks despite the fact that the benefit of doing so is zero.
As the cost of holding interbank deposits is zero by assumption banks would be
indifferent between holding deposits in other banks experiencing the same liquidity
shock. For tractability we assume that there are no interbank deposits held by an
odd bank in another odd bank. We note that if a complete network structure is
assumed the qualitative nature of the results is unaffected. We further note that
within the incomplete network structure each bank only holds deposits in one other
bank so there is no risk sharing effect in the incomplete network structure.
Each bank holds enough interbank deposits to cover the excess demand for liquidity
in the case of a high liquidity demand (λH). As there are N/2 banks with negatively
correlated liquidity shocks each bank j holds zj = λH−λ
(N/2
in each of the N/2 banks
with the other liquidity shock.7
At t=1 banks with a high liquidity demand must pay c1 to λH of its depositors
and honour the claims of the N
2
− 1 other high liquidity demand banks. In order to
finance this they liquidate their short asset y and redeem their deposits from the N
2
even banks which have a low liquidity demand. The budget constraint is therefore
given by
λHc1 = y +
N
2
zc1 (1.10)
=⇒ λHc1 = y + (λH − λ)c1
This simplifies to the profit maximising condition λc1 = y. A bank with low liquidity
7So an odd bank has interbank deposits in the N/2 even banks, and vice-versa. The results are
not qualitatively affected if we assume the bank j holds deposits in all other banks k 6= j.
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demand must pay c1 to λL of its depositors and honour the claims of the
N
2
high
demand. In order to finance this they simply liquidate the short asset y. The budget
constraint in this case is given by:[
λL +
N
2
(
λH − λ
N/2
)]
c1 = y (1.11)
The above expression also reduces to the profit maximising condition λc1 = y. In
period 2 banks liquidate all remaining assets, and in contrast to AG, profits are
retained. Therefore the budget constraint for a bank which had a high liquidity
demand at t = 1 can be written as[
(1− λH) + N
2
(
λH − λ
N/2
)]
c2 + Π = R(1− y) (1.12)
Substituting the profit maximising conditions (A.10), (A.13), (1.8) and (1.9) into
this expression the condition is satisfied. The period 2 budget constraint for a bank
which had a low liquidity demand at t=1 is given by, the following expression which
is also satisfied.
(1− λL)c2 + Π = R(1− y) + N
2
(
λH − λ
N/2
)
c2 (1.13)
Thus using the interbank deposit network banks are able to provide the second best
deposit contract (c∗1, c
∗
2) in both states 1 and 2. The following subsection analyses
the outcome in the third state S¯ in which there is excess liquidity demand in the
banking system leading to the possibility that one bank may fail and to that it may
spread to other banks in the system.
1.3.4 Crisis state S¯
In state S¯ all banks other than bank 1 have a liquidity demand of λ and bank 1
has a liquidity demand equal to λ + . The liquidity demands of each bank are
summarised in table 1.1 As the state S¯ occurs with zero probability it does not
affect the allocation at t = 0. In state S¯ early depositors always withdraw their
deposits at t = 1, and late depositors now withdraw at t = 1 if c1 > c2, or withdraw
at t = 2 otherwise. Banks are contractually required to pay c1 to all who demand
withdrawal at t = 1.
1.3.5 Collateralised borrowing at t = 1
As the deposit market is imperfectly competitive banks are able to earn strictly pos-
itive profits by obtaining returns on their investments which exceed their liabilities
to depositors. The profits are obtained at t = 2 as the bank optimally invests as
little in the short asset y as is required to serve its early depositors (which form a
proportion λ of the banks total depositors, in expected terms). In the crisis state
S¯ we assume that banks are able to obtain a 1 period ahead loan from an external
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lender of last resort at an interest rate l to be repaid at t = 2 using its profits
earned in that period. Note there are zero profits at t=1 so if we were to relax this
assumption and have the 1 period ahead loan also available in states 1 and 2 then
the bank would be unable to borrow from the external lender at t = 0. Also note
that in AG the profits are zero in both periods so the loan is not available to banks.
As the liquidity shock has already been realised, and R is non-stochastic, the profits
are determined in period 1 and known to the external lender so the rate l is an
exogenously determined interest rate for risk-free lending.
1.3.6 Pecking order
As in AG we define a pecking order which defines the order in which banks liquidate
their assets. The pecking order assumed is that banks first liquidate the short-
asset, then borrow by sacrificing period 2 profits, then liquidate deposits, and finally
liquidate their long asset. This requires the following assumption:
1 < l <
c2
c1
<
R
r
(1.14)
where l is the gross interest rate on loans. By liquidating one unit of the short asset
today the bank forgoes one unit of profit tomorrow, whereas obtaining one unit of
loan today forgoes l > 1 unit of profit tomorrow. Note that the external lender is
only willing to offer the loan if the bank will have sufficient profits to repay the loan
i.e. L ≤ Π/l where L is the amount borrowed by the bank at t=1, so if part of the
long asset is liquidated early the lender will be willing to lend less. From equation
(A.9) we know that c2/c1 = R > 1, and finally if we assume that early liquidation
of the long asset is costly i.e. r < 1 then the pecking order is established.
If a bank is bankrupt i.e. if it cannot meet the demands of it’s depositors by either
by using the profit-collateralised loan or by liquidating some of its long asset, it
is required to immediately liquidate all its assets. There is no sequential service
constraint so all depositors (including banks) receive an equal proportion of the
liquidated assets. So the amount paid out at t = 1 is c1 if the bank is not bankrupt,
otherwise it is equal to a liquidation value. Thus the bank has limited liability, and
depositors bear the risk of the bank not being able to deliver on their promised
consumption c1 or c2. The equilibrium liquidation value q
j equates the liquidated
banks’ assets i.e. the short asset y, the loan from the external lender and the
interbank claims on other banks, with the liabilities i.e. deposits held by consumers
and other banks.
qj =
y + rx+ N
2
zqk
1 +N2z
(1.15)
A bank which is unable to serve its early depositors with the short asset alone must
forgo profits and/or liquidate other assets. In order to prevent a run the bank must
provide late depositors with at least c1 so if a fraction ω the bank’s customers are
early type, it must keep a buffer b(ω) = max
(
Π/l, r[x− (1−ω)c1
R
]
)
. The maximum
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operator here reflects the fact that a bank in crisis will first try to serve customers
with the profit-collateralised loan, however if this is not possible the bank will resort
to liquidating the long-asset, and liquidation of the long asset (x) means that the
profits (Π) are zero.
In state S¯ bank 1 has an excess demand for liquidity of (λ+)c1−y = c1. Assuming
that all other banks have sufficient liquidity the value of the interbank deposits held
by bank 1 is qk = c1∀k 6= j. In order to prevent a run in bank 1 the excess demand
for liquidity must be less than the buffer so the following condition must hold:
c1 ≤ b(λ+ ) = max
(
Π/l, r
[
x− (1− (λ+ ))c1
R
])
(1.16)
Note that c1, profits and the proceeds from sale of the long asset are all decreasing
in N and increasing in d, however the terms on the right hand side of equation
(1.16) decline more rapidly with N and increase more rapidly with d. Thus a crisis
in bank 1 is triggered for a wider range of  as concentration decreases (i.e. as N
increases), and as competition increases (i.e. as d decreases) providing unequivocable
support for the concentration-stability and competition-fragility views respectively
for individual banking crises. However as this paper concerns systemic rather than
individual bank crises, the key question is how competition and concentration affect
the likelihood of the crisis spreading to other banks. Therefore we assume condition
(1.16) is violated so that bank 1 fails. If bank 1 fails then the interbank claims
on bank 1 are worth q1 < c1 and interconnected banks lose (c1 − q1)z. Note that
the size of the shock  affects whether or not bank 1 fails, but does not determine
the liquidation value of bank 1’s deposits, as all of bank 1’s depositors withdraw in
period 1 in the event of a run which does not depend on the proportion of early
depositors. Since each bank holds just enough of the short asset y to satisfy its own
early customers, all other banks will become bankrupt, and hence there is contagion,
if the following condition is violated.
(c1 − q1)z ≤ b(λ) = max
(
Π/l, r[x− (1− λ)c1
R
]
)
(1.17)
The comparative statics of the above expression are contained in the Appendix.
Increased competition increases the parameter space in which contagion occurs as
increased competition reduces the profit buffer of each bank within the system,
reducing the ability of the banking system to absorb the excess liquidity demand.
Increased concentration has a more subtle effect as it increases the profit buffer with
which losses can be absorbed, but also concentrates the interbank deposit network,
increasing the breadth of the channel of contagion of the initial bank failure. Crises
are more likely to spread contagiously if the interbank-deposit holding are large,
which is the case if there are large variations in liquidity demand in non-crisis states
1 and 2 (i.e. the higher is ρ = λH − λ), and less likely to spread if the external is
large (i.e. if R or d is large, and l is small).
As N increases the losses of interconnected banks (the left hand side of condition
(A.2) falls as interbank deposits are held in a larger number of banks so the relative
impact is lower, making systemic crises less likely. On the other hand, as N increases
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the profits buffer falls and the proceeds from the early liquidation of the long asset
falls, making systemic crises more likely. If profits are sufficiently high in a highly
concentrated industry and the profit-collateralised loan is low, then the overall effect
is that an increase in N is that the industry moves from a stable position to systemic
crisis, supporting the concentration stability view. This is the case if the return on
the long asset (R) is high and competition is weak (i.e. d is large)8, the external
loan interest rate (l) is low, and the losses from early liquidation of the long asset
are small (i.e. R−r
R
is small). In the parameter space in which the buffer consists of
the liquidated long asset (as the profit collateralised loan provides less funding), the
losses from early liquidation are important as they determine the liquidation value
of bank 1. If the losses from early liquidation is low, and competition is weak there
is no systemic crisis regardless of the concentration in the industry. On the other
hand if the losses from early liquidation are high (i.e. r/R is small), and competition
is highly intense (i.e. d is small) a systemic crisis is unavoidable regardless of the
concentration of the industry. If the liquidation of the long asset is low, banks
buffers consist of the profit collateralised loan. In this case increased concentration
may either reduce or increase the parameter space in which a banking crisis spreads
contagiously as shown in the Appendix. Concentration promotes stability if the
return on the long asset is high(R is high), competition is weak (d is high) and
the difference in liquidity demand between states 1 and 2 (ρ) or the external loan
interest rate l is small.
As d increases competition between banks becomes less intense and banks’ enjoy
a stronger degree of market power from greater horizontal differentiation. Both
profits and the proceeds from early liquidation of the long asset are increasing in d
so as the intensity of competition (for a given level of concentration) in the banking
industry increases the buffer falls and crises become more likely. Note that unlike
concentration, there is no risk-sharing effect from an increase in the intensity of
competition so the effect is unambiguously to increase the likelihood of systemic
crisis, thus supporting the competition-fragility view.
1.3.7 Numerical Results
The effect of greater intensity of competition, and greater concentration on financial
stability can be examined by analysing how the number of banks N (equivalently a
reduction in concentration), and the transport cost d respectively affect the incidence
of systemic banking failure. The results summarised in Table 1.2 highlights how an
increase in the number of banks affects the profit buffer, the liquidation buffer and
the losses in interbank claims.
The results of the model depend crucially on the parameter values used. Parameter
values were selected for comparability with AG and to preserve the liquidity pecking
order. They are (R = 1.5, r = 0.4,d = 0.2,λL = 0.4,λH = 0.6,λ = 0.5, = 0.1,l =
1.3). The critical value of  required to induce a crisis in bank 1 is also reported
to illustrate how concentration affects the individual stability of a bank to liquidity
shocks. As the concentration of the industry falls the profit buffer of bank 1 falls
and a crisis is triggered for a lower value of  meaning that individual banking crises
8See equation (1.9).
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Table 1.2 – Impact of number of firms of buffers, losses and crises
Number of banks 2 4 6 8 10
Critical value of  0.067 0.033 0.022 0.017 0.013
Profit-collateralised loan 0.0524 0.0137 0.0062 0.0035 0.0023
Buffer 0.0524 0.0190 0.0129 0.0098 0.0078
Loss 0.0394 0.0205 0.0139 0.0105 0.0084
Buffer remaining 0.0131 -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0006
Note: Negative values indicate a systemic banking crisis.
are less likely in more concentrated industries. As the research question concerns
systemic crises the value of the following rows reported in Table (1.2) assume  = 0.1
in order to ensure that condition (23) is violated and there is a crisis in bank 1 for all
values of N considered. The relationship between concentration and systemic stabil-
ity is non-trivial. This partly follows from the fact that profits can only be used as
a buffer if, by using the profit-collateralised loan, the bank avoid failure. This is the
case for a highly concentrated duopolostic banking industry in which case the inter-
connected bank is able to absorb the loss in interbank deposits held in bank 1 with
the profit buffer. However in a less concentrated industry (i.e. N ≥ 4) the profits at
t = 2 provide insufficient collateral with which to borrow and avoid a failure. In this
case banks must liquidate their long asset early which provides greater liquidity, but
this is also insufficient to prevent failure and all interconnected banks in industries
with 4 or more banks fail. The results for the given parameter values therefore sup-
port the concentration-stability hypothesis. The buffer remaining however increases
slightly as N increases reflecting the decreased concentration of interbank holdings
in the failed bank 1, and the fact that profits are a convex function of N. Note that
this result depends on the parameters used and whist concentration unambiguously
makes an individual crisis less likely (in terms of increasing the size of the shock 
which is required to make a bank fail), the effect of contagion on the likelihood of
contagion depends on the parameter values assumed.
In order to explore the relationship between concentration, competition and systemic
crises we consider a range of values for the parameter d in Table 1.3. The table
highlights that the stability of the system is highly sensitive to the intensity of
competition. If d = 0.1, the profit buffer is low and all banks fail, regardless of the
concentration. If d = 0.2 if one bank fails in a duopolistic banking industry the
interconnected bank is able to use the profit buffer to avoid a crisis, whereas there
would be a systemic crisis in a less concentrated industry. If d = 1 the system is
stable regardless of the level of concentration, however the buffer remaining falls in
less concentrated banking systems.
Table 1.3 – Impact of intensity of competition on buffer remaining
Number of banks 2 4 6 8 10
d=0.1 -0.0170 -0.0120 -0.0079 -0.0059 -0.0047
d=0.2 0.0131 -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0006
d=1 0.1812 0.0677 0.0471 0.0362 0.0294
Note: Negative values indicate a systemic banking crisis.
These results generally support the concentration-stability views and competition-
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fragility views. Note whilst concentration unambiguously supports individual bank
stability, the contagion of the banking crisis depends on the values of parameters
used as outlined in the Appendix. Note that crises can occur in both highly concen-
trated and highly diffuse banking industries, as even in highly concentrated market
structures with low intensity of competition crises may occur if the loss from early
liquidation is large enough (i.e. R/r is low enough), if the interbank-holdings large
enough (i.e. if the variation in liquidity demands in states 1 and 2, (λH −λ) is large
enough, and if the interest rate on the profit-collateralised loan (l) is high enough.
1.4 Positive probability of crisis
The preceding analysis was predicated on the assumption that the probability of a
state of excess liquidity demand (S¯) occurring is zero. This assumption makes the
maximisation problem of the banks considerably more tractable as it implies that
banks’ optimising behaviour does not take into account state S¯. As AG note9 when
the probability of state S¯ occurring is positive the banks’ maximisation problem
is considerably more complicated. AG argue that if the probability of state S¯ is
sufficiently low then banks would find it optimal to bear the risk of a crisis occurring
rather than holding more of the liquid asset, as the opportunity cost of holding
extra liquidity is too high. However AG do not characterise the conditions under
which banks would seek to hold extra liquidity. This section analyses under what
conditions banks find it optimal to hold extra liquidity, and which effects competition
and concentration have on the likelihood of banks holding insufficient liquidity to
avoid crises.
Table 1.4 presents the liquidity demands in crisis and non-crisis states, for the specific
case of N = 4 crisis state. The number of crisis states is now equal to the number
of banks, each occurring with equal probability. This ensures that the allocations
will be symmetric and all banks will find it optimal to hold interbank deposits in all
other banks.
Table 1.4 – Banks’ Liquidity Shocks with proportional probability of a systemic
event.
State Probability Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Average
1 1−Np
2
λH λL λH λL λ
2 1−Np
2
λL λH λL λH λ
S¯A p λ+  λ λ λ λ+ /N
S¯B p λ λ+  λ λ λ+ /N
S¯C p λ λ λ+  λ λ+ /N
S¯D p λ λ λ λ+  λ+ /N
For this section of the paper retail deposits are assumed to be fully insured, and
thus retail depositors receive their promised repayment c1 or c2 in periods 1 and 2
respectively in all states so their expected utility of consuming a deposit contract
9On page 29 of Allen and Gale (2000).
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offering (c1, c2) is the same as in the above analysis.
10 Interbank deposits remain
uninsured so interconnected banks remain subject to negative spillovers if the bank
fails.
Each bank j faces excess liquidity demands in crisis state S¯j with positive probability
p, and each of the rival banks experiences excess liquidity demands in states S¯−j
with total probability (N − 1)p. Given a sufficiently high probability p of crisis
states S¯ banks may wish to prevent runs by holding more of the short asset. The
following section derives the contract (c1, c2, x, y, z) assuming that the bank wishes
to be able to serve all early depositors in a crisis state without resorting to early
liquidation of the long asset. The outcomes will then be compared with those in
which the bank just holds enough liquidity to serve customers in states 1 and 2, and
thus faces excess liquidity demand in all states S¯j. When the probability of a crisis
state occurring (p) is low, it is better for the bank to just ignore the crisis states and
bear the risk of failure. This result is partly due to limited liability which ensures
that payoff for each bank is bounded from below at zero.
1.4.1 Safe asset portfolio
The following allocation ensured that the excess liquidity demand of the bank j in
state Sj does not result in a crisis and that there is no need to liquidate the long
asset. For the sake of tractability the profit-collateralised loan is assumed to be
unavailable to banks, so that according to the pecking order banks first liquidate
short asset holdings, then interbank deposits and finally long asset holdings.
In crisis states S¯j there is an excess liquidity demand in the banking system as a
whole of c1 relative to non-crisis states 1 and 2. Given that the liquidity demands are
distributed symmetrically the excess liquidity demand can be met by each individual
bank holding an equal amount of extra short asset relative to the allocation with
zero-probability crisis state. Thus the amount of short asset each bank must hold
in order to avoid a crisis in all states is given by
y =
Nλ
N + d
+
c1
N
=
Nλ+ 
N + d
(1.18)
The interbank deposits need to be large enough so that in both crisis and non-crisis
states the interbank deposit channels are wide enough for the banks to be able to
obtain the liquidity it needs. By assumption the excess demand for liquidity () is
greater than the variation in liquidity demand in non crisis-states (i.e. 2(λH−λL) >
).
Therefore the interbank deposits can be expressed as:
z = max
(

N
,
λH − λL
N/2
)
=

N
(1.19)
10In the above analysis insurance against the excess liquidity demand in the crisis state S¯ was
not needed as the state occurs with zero probability.
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From (1.19) it is evident that if the liquidity shock is larger than the variability of
liquidity demands in non-crisis states 1 and 2 then the size of the liquidity shock
determines the ’width’ of the interbank deposit channels. The allocation is given by
the following tuple.
(c1, c2, x, y, z) =
(
N
N + d
,
RN
N + d
,
N + d−Nλ− 
N + d
,
Nλ+ 
N + d
,

N
)
(1.20)
Given that banks are symmetric, the increased liquidity demand can be accommo-
dated through liquidation of the short asset, borrowing through the profit-collateralised
loan and withdrawals of interbank deposits, so bank failure does not occur in any
state and there is no contagion.
If the banks hold the safe asset portfolio the average profit earned in the non-crisis
states S1 and S2 is lower as banks forgo the higher return on the long asset by
holding liquidity in excess of the average liquidity demand, thus forgoing the higher
return on the long asset. The average profit in these two states is given by:
Π1,2 =
1
N
(y +Rx− λc1 − (1− λ)c2) = Rd− (R− 1)
N2 +Nd
(1.21)
Profits of bank j in state S¯j are given by
ΠSj =
1
N
(Rx− (1− λ− )c2 − (N − 1)zc2) = Rd
N2 +Nd
(1.22)
In states S−j a single interconnected bank has its own liquidity demand shock and
bank j provides it with liquidity zc1 at t = 1 and obtains zc2 at t = 2 in return. In
state Sk all interbank deposit claims bank j holds in other banks other than bank
k net out, and there is no loss in value of the interbank deposits held in bank k as
bank failure is averted. The profits of bank j in state S−j are given by
ΠS−j =
1
N
(Rx+ zc2 − (1− λ)c2) = Rd
N2 +Nd
(1.23)
The expected value of profits is given by the following expression:
EΠ∗ = (1−Np)Rd− (R− 1)
N2 +Nd
+Np
Rd
N2 +Nd
=
Rd−Np(R− 1)
N2 +Nd
(1.24)
1.4.2 When banks optimally hold extra liquidity buffers
If banks hold y < Nλ+
N+d
then in states Sj there is excess liquidity demand in the
banking system. However with probability 1−Np there is no crisis and the profits of
the bank are Rd
N2+Nd
. With probability p the bank faces a potential crisis stemming
from excess liquidity demand from its own depositors, and with probability (N-1)p
the bank faces a potential crisis stemming from contagion from other banks through
interbank deposits. In these states the bank earns the profits it would receive in a
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non-crisis state, less any losses due to the crisis. Banks have limited liability in the
AG model so the minimum payoff in any state is zero.
It is most interesting to consider the situation in which systemic crises would occur
if banks hold the risky asset portfolio. This requires some technical condition to be
satisfied which are detailed in the Appendix. In this case bank holding the risky
asset portfolio obtain profit given by the expression in (1.9) in non-crisis states
which occur with probability 1-Np, and zero profit in crisis states which occur with
probability Np, so the expected payoff is given by:
EΠRISKY = (1−Np) Rd
N2 +Nd
(1.25)
Given the safe asset portfolio the profits in normal times are
Rd− (R− 1)
N2 +Nd
(1.26)
The profit in the state in which the bank has excess liquidity demand from its retail
depositors is
Rd−RN
N2 +Nd
(1.27)
As each bank avoids failure there are no contagion to other banks. Thus the profits
earned in the states in which other banks have excess liquidity demand is given by
(1.26). The expected profits of holding the safe asset portfolio are thus given by:
EΠSAFE = (1− p)Rd− (R− 1)
N2 +Nd
+ p
Rd−RN
N2 +Nd
=
Rd− (1− p)(R− 1)− pRN
N2 +Nd
(1.28)
The bank earns higher profits ex-ante if it simply bares the risk of crisis occurring
by holding the risky asset portfolio if the following condition holds
EΠRISKY = (1−Np) Rd
N2 +Nd
> EΠSAFE =
Rd− (1− p)(R− 1)− pRN
N2 +Nd
(1.29)
which simplifies to
p < p∗ =
(R− 1)
(R− 1)+NR(d− ) (1.30)
The critical probability p∗ is strictly decreasing in N as δp
∗
δN
= − R(d−)
(R−1)+NR(d−)2 < 0,
given that d > .11 Thus as the concentration decreases banks prefer to hold the
safe asset portfolio as the number of banks proportionately increases the probability
11Recall that  < 1− λ and d is unbounded.
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of a crisis state occurring. As the intensity of competition increases i.e. as the
transport cost d falls, the marginal effect of an increase in N on p∗ is reduced.
The critical probability p∗ is also strictly decreasing in the ’transport cost’ d as
δp1
δd
= − NR
(R−1)+NR(d−)2 < 0 implying that the intensity of competition increases the
banks prefer to hold the risky asset portfolio.
The above comparison neglects the possibility that banks may hold more liquidity
than in the safe asset portfolio but less liquidity than in the risky asset portfolio. If
the bank A hold liquidity y ∈ (λc1, (λ + N )c1) then in the state S¯A the bank will
need to use some buffer to meet the excess liquidity demand.
Without loss of generality the portfolio choice of the bank can be represented as
(x, y, z) =
(
1− y, (λ+ α
N
)c1,

N
)
(1.31)
where 0 < α <  and 
N
> λH−λL
N/2
. In the state S¯A bank A has liquidity demand
(λ+)c1 but only has available liquidity (λ+α)c1. If the bank is able to accommodate
this excess demand using its buffer the cost is R
r
( − α)c1. It can be shown that
unless the bank j is able to prevent early liquidation of the long asset in its own
crisis state S¯j it would not hold extra liquidity as to do so would be of no benefit.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper investigated the relationship between concentration, competition and
stability in the banking industry by introducing imperfect competition ala Salop
(1979) in the Allen and Gale (2000) model of contagion. The relationship between
concentration and stability primarily depends on the intensity of competition be-
tween banks as measured by the intensity of competition and the quantity of inter-
bank holdings, which depend on variations in liquidity demands in non-crisis states.
The main result is that increased competition and reduced concentration tends to
make the bank system more fragile as in more concentrated systems the profit buffer
exceeds the increased concentration of interbank holdings. However systemic crises
may still arise in a range of market structures.
If the probability of crisis is small but strictly positive banks find it optimal to
hold the risky asset portfolio if the cost of holding the extra liquidity (i.e. forgone
return on the long asset) is greater in expected value terms than the lost profit
from a crisis occurring. As concentration increases and competition decreases crises
may be absorbed more easily meaning that crises are triggered for a smaller range of
parameter values. As concentration increases the critical probability increases and as
competition decreases the critical probability falls. This supports the concentration-
stability and competition-fragility views.
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Debt, Equity and Moral Hazard:
The Optimal Structure of Banks’
Loss Absorbing Capacity
Joint with Misa Tanaka, Bank of England1
2.1 Introduction
A key aim of the post-crisis global regulatory reform effort has been to end the
problem of large globally, systemically important banks (G-SIBs) being ‘too big to
fail’. A bank is ‘too big to fail’ if it is so large that its failure could destabilise
the entire financial system so that public authorities are compelled to bail it out
by providing financial assistance to prevent a systemic failure. The expectation of
such a bailout in turn encourages its shareholders and executives to take socially
excessive risks, thus increasing the expected liabilities for taxpayers.
The post-crisis regulatory reforms included a number of new requirements for G-
SIBs, aimed at ending ‘too big to fail’. First, G-SIBs are required to maintain a
higher capital ratio during normal times relative to the smaller, less systemic banks.
Under the new Basel III capital regulation, banks are subject to minimum capital
requirements and minimum capital buffers : whereas the minimum capital require-
ments must be met at all times by banks, banks can ‘use’ minimum capital buffers
to absorb unexpected losses on their asset portfolios without entering resolution.2
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those
of the Bank of England, the MPC or the FPC.
2It is important to make this distinction as prior to Basel III there was no minimum capital
buffer specified in the Accords. However the debate around minimum capital requirements often
focuses on the role of capital as a buffer against losses, even though the minimum capital require-
ments should be met at all times. Goodhart (2008) made the following metaphor for prudential
requirements: ”the weary traveller who arrives at the railway station late at night, and, to his
delight, sees a taxi there who could take him to his distant destination. He hails the taxi, but
the taxi driver replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws require that there must always
be one taxi standing ready at the station... required minimum capital [is not] fully usable capital
from the point of view of a bank.
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In addition to these requirements under the Basel III, G-SIBs are also required to
maintain an additional capital buffer in normal times, reflecting their greater im-
pact on systemic stability. Second, the Financial Stability Board also introduced a
new total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirement applicable to G-SIBs from 1
January 2019. TLAC may consist of capital instruments which count towards the
minimum capital requirements, and other eligible unsecured debt instruments with
residual maturity of over one year. The primary aim of the TLAC requirement is to
ensure that there is sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity available
in resolution to implement an orderly resolution of bank failures, reducing potential
systemic instability and recourse to taxpayer funds.3 A breach or likely breach of
the TLAC requirement will be treated as severely as a breach or a likely breach of
minimum capital requirements.
In this paper, we develop a simple framework in order to examine the optimal setting
of the triplet of regulatory requirements: a minimum capital requirement and a
minimum TLAC requirement, which both need to be met at all times, and a capital
buffer requirement, which banks can deplete to absorb losses in stressed conditions
without entering resolution. In our model, banks are funded by equity, long-term
unsecured (bail-inable) debt, and insured deposits. Equity is privately costly relative
to the unsecured debt and insured deposits, which is passed through into tighter
credit conditions reducing economic activity. However, equity has the advantage of
absorbing losses without creating wider social costs whilst the bank remains a going
concern i.e. whilst the amount of equity is non-negative, however a ”bail-in” of
unsecured debt holders in which some or all of the interest and principle is written
down will require a modification of the contract which is likely to generate social
deadweight costs, including legal and administrative costs incurred by the bank and
resolution authority, and could lead to contagion by triggering a generalised freeze of
unsecured debt market for other systemic banks.4 Finally, ‘bail-out’ of either insured
depositors or other creditors is funded by distortionary taxation which creates a
deadweight cost.
Our model also incorporates two moral hazard problems, which are dependent on
the bank’s funding structure: i) ex-ante, banks that maximise shareholder returns
have the incentive to shirk on costly project monitoring efforts in the presence of flat-
rate deposit insurance, thus increasing the risk of a failure, and ii) ex-post, poorly
capitalised, limitedly liable banks have the incentive to engage in asset substitution
by taking excessive risks at the expense of the deposit insurance fund (or taxpayers)
and the long-term unsecured debt holders. Thus, the regulator optimally sets the
trio of regulatory requirements to eliminate these two types of moral hazard, while
trading-off the ex-ante and ex-post costs and benefits of equity against debt and
deposits as outlined above.
Our analysis yields the following key results. First, we demonstrate that the ex-
ante moral hazard problem can be addressed by ensuring that in the event of a bank
failure, private investors (as opposed to taxpayers) will absorb sufficient amount of
losses. That means that the regulator needs to ensure that the TLAC plus equity
capital buffer is sufficiently high ex-ante but it also means that the composition
3FSB Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation capacity.
4As suggested by Goodhart and Avgouleas (2014).
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of this private loss absorbing capacity is irrelevant for ex-ante moral hazard when
unsecured debt market can price risks and penalise risk-taking through a higher
interest rate. Second, we show that, in order to prevent the ex-post moral hazard,
the resolution authority needs to intervene and ‘bail in’ unsecured debt as soon
as the minimum capital requirement is breached. Hence, the minimum capital
requirement should be set at a level below which shareholders’ ‘skin in the game’ is
too low such that banks have the incentive to engage in socially suboptimal asset
substitution. Third, the optimal level of capital buffer is determined by a trade-off
between the social cost of equity issuance and the benefit of reducing the probability
and the cost of a bank failure.
Our simple framework also enables an analysis of how changes in economic condi-
tions might alter the optimal trio of regulatory requirements. Our analysis suggests
that a higher bail-in cost calls for a higher capital buffer and a lower TLAC require-
ment, whereas a higher bail-out cost calls for both the capital buffer and the TLAC
requirement to be raised. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that, in response to
an elevated risk of a system-wide shock, the regulator may want to increase the
capital buffer while reducing the TLAC requirement. This is because an increased
risk of a system-wide shock increases the expected cost of bank insolvency, and an
additional capital buffer helps to reduce the risk of bank insolvency.
2.2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to a number of existing papers that have examined the im-
pact of capital requirements on banks’ risk-taking incentives. The traditional view
is that increased capital requirements promote social welfare by curtailing banks’
incentives to shift risks onto the taxpayers when banks are limitedly liable and ben-
efit from implicit (e.g. the expectation that creditors will be bailed out as the bank
is TBTF) or explicit (e.g. flat-rate deposit insurance) government guarantees (e.g.
Keeley(1990), Rochet (1992)). This view has been challenged by more recent studies
which suggest a more nuanced effect. For example, Hellman et al (2000) show that
capital requirements have two counteracting effects on the incentive for a bank to
take on a more risky investment project. On the one hand, an increase in capital
requirements increases shareholders’ ‘skin in the game’ by putting more of the their
equity capital at risk: this has the effect of reducing the incentive to take on risk.
But on the other hand, an increase in capital requirements also reduces the bank’s
profit margin, thus eroding its franchise value and incentivising it to take on greater
risks. The authors conclude that the overall effect of capital requirements on banks’
risk-taking is ambiguous. Allen et al (2011) show how optimal capital regulation
depends on the presence of deposit insurance, and competition in the deposit and
credit markets. With perfect competition for uninsured deposits, there would be no
need for capital regulation as market discipline induces banks to maintain some cap-
ital to ensure they have skin in the game, resulting in a lower deposit interest rates.
If deposits are insured, however, a moral hazard problem arises as limitedly liable
banks may shift risk onto the deposit insurance (given flat-rate deposit insurance).
In our model, the presence of limitedly liable banks which are partly financed by
insured deposits yields the same incentive to shift risk onto the deposit insurance
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fund.
In addition to the impact on banks’ ex-ante incentives to take risk, bank capital also
has a role in acting as a buffer between the asset portfolio realisation and liabilities,
reducing the probability and cost of failure (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Our
model captures both the skin-in-the-game and buffer views of capital regulation, as
the bank’s liability structure determines its incentives to invest in riskier projects,
as well as the probability of a risk-shifting problem arising ex-post.
Furthermore, our paper considers the optimal minimum capital requirement, TLAC
requirement, and capital buffer in a single framework, reflecting the new regulatory
environment of G-SIBs. Given the new nature of these requirements, there has
been little research in this area to date, although a number of existing papers have
examined the issue of how contingent-convertible bonds (Cocos) and bail-inable
debt might affect banks’ incentives. For example, Martynova and Perotti (2015)
analyse how contingent-convertible bonds affect banks’ risk-taking behaviour, and
argue that Cocos that trigger when banks are solvent will reduce their risk-shifting
incentives more than bail-in bonds, which they assume will convert into equity or
be written down only when the bank becomes insolvent. While we do not explicitly
examine the role of Cocos, we also argue that, for bail-in bonds to reduce banks’ (ex-
post) risk-shifting incentives, they need to convert while equity value is still positive.
We also examine how a bank’s ex-ante risk-taking incentives are influenced by the
funding mix and show that equity and bail-in debt have the same disciplining effect
on banks.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on bank failure resolution. In
our model, the rationale for resolution arises due to the need to intervene promptly
to prevent undercapitalised banks from ‘gambling for resurrection’ by investing in
excessively risky but high return assets, as in Tanaka and Hoggarth (2006) and
De Niccolo et al (2014). The existing literature has also examined the possibility
of time-inconsistent resolution authority (e.g. Mailath and Mester (1994)). In our
analysis, the resolution authority can credibly intervene as soon as the bank breaches
the minimum capital requirement whilst the bank is still solvent because allowing
undercapitalised banks to continue operating will encourage them to gamble for
resurrection and magnify the losses for unsecured debt holders and the deposit in-
surance fund and expected social cost of resolution, so resolution is time-consistent
in our model.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.3 develops the baseline
model, in which the probability of a bad state, or a system-wide shock – which
reduces asset return for all banks – is assumed to be exogenous: thus, we focus
on the impact of ex-post moral hazard in the baseline analysis. Section 2.4 solves
for the model equilibrium and clarifies the determinants of the optimal regulatory
requirements. Section 2.5 endogenises the probability of the bad state, which is
now determined by banks’ decision about whether to monitor the project or not.
This extended model allows us to analyse policies to mitigate ex-ante moral hazard.
Section 2.6 concludes.
Chapter 2 John Vourdas 29
Essays on Financial Stability
2.3 The model
This section outlines our baseline, three-period model. We assume that the reg-
ulator initially imposes regulatory requirements consisting of a minimum capital
requirement, a TLAC requirement, and a capital buffer on ex-ante identical banks.
There are two macroeconomic states of the world, H (’good’) and L (’bad’), which
determine the interim return that banks receive. Banks are ex-post heterogeneous,
because in the bad state, they receive different returns, which are unknown ex- ante.
In the baseline model, banks are only subject to ex-post moral hazard: banks with
little skin in the game i.e. returns net of liabilities have the incentives to engage in
asset substitution – or gamble for resurrection – in order to maximise shareholder
returns at the expense of the unsecured debt holders and the deposit insurance fund
(DIF). The presence of this ex-post moral hazard creates a case for the resolution
authority to intervene and resolve undercapitalised banks in order to prevent them
from failing with larger losses – which also imply larger social costs – at a later date.
2.3.1 Ex-ante regulatory requirements and investment (t=0)
There are three periods: t = 0, 1, 2. All agents are risk-neutral, and the banking
sector consists of a continuum of ex-ante identical banks of mass 1. At the start
t = 0, ex-ante identical banks each have an investment opportunity which requires
a unit of funds, and the regulator sets rules on how it should be funded. The bank
can fund its investment using three different types of instruments to maintain the
following balance sheet identity:
E0 +G+D = 1
where E0 is initial (t = 0) equity investment; G is uninsured, unsecured debt; and D
is the insured deposits. We define the ‘private loss absorbing capacity’ as θ ≡ E0+G,
and the share of equity within this as e0. Hence, the items on the liability side of
the balance sheet can be rewritten as: E0 = θe0, G = θ(1 − e0), and D = 1 − θ.
Debt and deposits mature at t = 2, and their holders are repaid the full principal
and interest if the bank is solvent, whereas equity holders receive the residual value.
But if it is insolvent, then equity holders are wiped out, whereas the uninsured debt
holders receive the residual return. As explained in Section 2.3.2, the regulator
can also ‘resolve’ the bank if it is found to be in breach of the minimum capital
requirement at t = 1. Some banks that are resolved at t = 1 are balance sheet
solvent, even though they are in breach of the minimum capital requirement: in this
case, none of the claimholders will suffer any losses. If, however, a bank is found
to be insolvent at t = 1, equity holders receive zero, whereas the uninsured debt
holders receive the residual return after depositors are repaid. The interest rate i
on the unsecured debt G factors in the state of the world in which the unsecured
creditors are bailed in so that i ≥ 1, depending on the return RL in the bad state
of the world as shown in section 2.4.3 below.
Insured deposits have a unit gross return in all states of the world, because the
deposit insurance fund (DIF) will cover any shortfall if the bank has insufficient
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resources to pay depositors. The DIF is funded by flat-rate contributions which for
paucity we normalise to zero.5
We assume that, when setting regulatory requirements, the regulator knows that
the bank can invest in a project that yields a ‘high’ return equal to RH in the ’good’
macroeconomic state, which occurs with probability q, and a ‘low’ return R˜L in the
’bad’ state which occurs with probability 1− q at t = 1: 1− q could be interpreted
as the probability of a system-wide stress which reduces return on assets across the
banking sector. In this section we assume that q is exogenous, but in Section 2.5
we endogenise the choice of q.
We assume that, in the ‘good’ macro state when R = RH , banks will be solvent with
certainty: RH > (1−θ)+iθ(1−e0), where i is the interest rate on unsecured debt. At
the start of t = 0, however, the low return is stochastic, with R˜L ∼ Unif [0, Rmax],
where Rmax ≤ RH , and we assume that banks and the regulator only know the
distribution of the low return. Thus, the solvency of each bank in the ‘bad’ macro
state depends on the realisation of RL relative to it’s liabilities D+G. We interpret
RL as bank ‘type’ which is ex-ante uncertain, and the regulator sets all requirements
without observing the realised RL for individual banks.
The regulator sets the following requirements, which are expressed as a ratio of the
bank’s (unweighted) assets.
1. the minimum capital requirement E∗ which the bank has to maintain both at
t = 0 and t = 1 in order to remain in business until t = 2
2. the capital buffer, denoted Eb, which the bank can use to absorb losses at
t = 1 without facing resolution when the return on assets turns out to be low
3. the minimum TLAC requirement τ ∗.
Note that, throughout our analysis, the risk weights are normalised to one, such
that capital ratios are defined as equity (which is equal to the value of assets minus
the value of liabilities) divided by the value of assets; and as the value of assets
is equal to one at t = 0, E0 can be interpreted as both the level of capital and
the capital ratio. At t = 0, the TLAC requirement can be satisfied using regulatory
capital instruments that are not used to meet regulatory capital buffers, E0−Eb, and
uninsured debt, G. As the capital buffer can be depleted to absorb losses at t = 1,
the TLAC requirement is satisfied as long as the sum of equity at t = 1 , denoted
as E1, and the uninsured debt G exceeds the minimum TLAC ratio τ
∗multiplied by
the value of the bank’s assets at t = 1. Formally the minimum capital and TLAC
requirements and capital buffers are given by (2.1),(2.2) and (2.3) respectively, where
Bt is the bank’s balance sheet size at time t, which is equal to 1 at time t = 0 and
either RH or RL at time t = 1, and (2.3) exploits the fact that B0 = 1.
Et ≥ E∗Bt∀t ∈ {0, 1} (2.1)
Et +G ≥ τ ∗Bt∀t ∈ {0, 1} (2.2)
E0 − E∗ ≥ Eb at t = 0 (2.3)
5Insured deposits can be also interpreted as any debt liabilities that are expected to be bailed
out by the government in the event of a bank failure.
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At t = 0 the bank has to satisfy all of the above requirements in order to start
operating, whereas at t = 1 the bank needs to satisfy both (2.1) and (2.2) in order
to avoid resolution. As we detail in the subsequent sections, the regulator chooses
these requirements in order to maximise the social welfare, taking into account the
following considerations:
1. The minimum capital ratio requirement E∗ needs to be set at a level below
which it can intervene to prevent undercapitalised banks from engaging in
asset substitution (‘gambling for resurrection’).
2. The capital buffer Eb needs to be set at levels that enable banks to absorb
some losses without facing resolution, while taking into account the social cost
of equity funding relative to debt and deposits.
3. The TLAC requirement τ ∗ needs to be set at levels that represents the best
trade-off between the cost of bail in (of uninsured creditors) and the cost of
bail out (of depositors).
At the end of period t = 0, RL is realised for each bank and becomes publicly
observable: this makes banks heterogeneous ex-post. Each bank then chooses
the amount of deposits, uninsured debt and equity to issue, subject to regulatory
constraints (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). We assume that all of the depositors, unsecured
creditors and equity holders are risk neutral and have access to a safe asset which
yields a certain return normalised to equal 1.
The assumptions of a risk-insensitive deposit insurance premium creates a departure
from the Modigliani and Miller (1958) result that, in a frictionless world, a firm’s
total cost of funding is independent of its funding structure. In our model, insured
deposits are the least costly form of funding for banks, as they benefit from the
implicit subsidy provided by the deposit insurance fund. The unsecured debt is
the second most expensive form of funding, as the unsecured debt holders demand
a premium over the safe interest rate (normalised to 1) in order to be compensated
for the credit risk (see Section 2.4.3 below). In addition, following the existing
corporate finance literature, we assume that equity capital is most costly, and a bank
incurs a private cost δ ≡ 1 + δs in issuing equity, where 1 is the equity investors’
opportunity cost of funding (given by the safe rate of return) and δs captures the
social deadweight costs associated with equity issuance. The social cost could, for
example, reflect the cost of overcoming the asymmetric information problem between
the bank’s potential equity investors and its executives, e.g. through cumbersome
disclosure. As Myers and Majluf (1984) have shown, the cost of equity issuance is
higher than the cost of debt issuance as the executives who have inside information
about the bank’s assets and investment opportunities have an adverse incentive to
issue equity when equity is overvalued. Thus, in our model, δs captures the social
cost of requiring banks to issue more capital, as we discuss more in detail in Section
2.4.4. As the issue of whether requiring banks to fund themselves with more capital
is socially costly or not has been a controversial one, we will also consider explicitly in
Section 2.4.4 the regulatory implications of having no social cost of equity issuance.
Thus, as we demonstrate formally in Section 2.4.3, banks’ capital and TLAC regu-
lations are binding in equilibrium: banks only issue as much equity and unsecured
debt as required by the regulator, in order to maximise the benefit derived from the
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implicit subsidy provided by the deposit guarantee.
We have chosen to model the sequence of events at t = 0 as above for two main
reasons. First, we want to allow for the possibility of bank failures, by capturing
the fact that the regulator typically sets requirements without full knowledge of
how each bank would perform under stressed conditions. If the regulator can set
all requirements separately for individual banks based on perfect knowledge of the
performance of their assets under all states of the world (i.e. RL for each bank is
known at the start of t = 0), then bank failures can be entirely eliminated by setting
the capital requirements sufficiently high to ensure that RL > D+G, and hence we
will not have an interesting problem to analyze. Second, we also wanted to ensure
that unsecured debt fully prices in the credit risk, in order to examine the role it
plays in providing market discipline and mitigating ex-ante moral hazard, which we
will analyze in Section 2.5.
2.3.2 Resolution and bail in in the interim period (t=1)
At time t = 1, the macroeconomic state is realised. Each bank receives the in-
terim return, which is either RH or RL depending on the macro state, and this will
determine its capital ratio at t = 1:
E1 = R−D − iG where R ∈ {RL, RH} (2.4)
If the interim return is RL and RL is sufficiently low, such that a bank does not
meet the pre-specified minimum regulatory capital ratio E∗, the regulator (or the
resolution authority) triggers ‘resolution’, and converts unsecured debt into equity
in order to recapitalise the bank, or writes down the value of the debt (‘bail in’).6
Specifically, we assume that the regulator triggers resolution if the following condi-
tion holds:
E1 = RL − (1− θ)− iθ(1− e0) < E∗RL (2.5)
The consequence of resolution and ‘bail in’ is explained more fully in Section 2.4.
We assume that, in the absence of resolution at t = 1, a bank can choose between
reinvesting the interim return either in a risky or a safe asset. The risky asset
yields a gross return γ > 1 at t = 2 with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p,
whereas the safe asset is a simple storage technology which yields a unit gross return
at t = 2. We assume that the risky asset has a negative net present value, such
that pγ < 1. Thus, the socially optimal choice is for the bank to reinvest its asset
return at t = 1 in the safe asset. However, the presence of long-term debt, which
only needs to be repaid at t = 2, and flat-rate (and therefore non actuarially fairly
priced) deposit insurance both create the incentive for the bank’s shareholders to
‘risk shift’, i.e. to take excessive risks at the expense of debt holders so as to
maximise shareholder returns. As we demonstrate in Section 2.4, undercapitalised
6As the intervention of the resolution authority is assumed to be costless, there is no loss in
economic value.
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banks have the incentive to ‘gamble for resurrection’ by investing in risky assets
at t = 1, thus magnifying the expected losses for creditors and the DIF.7 Thus,
the minimum capital requirement E∗ needs to be set in such a way to allow the
regulator to intervene to prevent this privately optimal but socially sub-optimal
gambling behaviour, once this threshold is breached.
2.3.3 Debt repayment in the final period (t=2)
At t = 2, all debt is repaid if the bank is solvent, and the equity holders receive the
residual return. If the bank is insolvent, insured depositors are paid in full by the
DIF but the unsecured debt holders receive zero. If the bank is insolvent but the
value of its assets exceed the liability to insured depositors, unsecured debt holders
receive the residual return after the payment to the depositors have been made; and
equity holders receive zero return.
We assume that, whilst equity is a costly means of financing banks, equity holders
can absorb losses without imposing costs on the rest of the society. By contrast, we
allow for the possibility that losses imposed on unsecured debt holders via a ‘bail in’
at t = 1, or at insolvency at t = 2, could give rise to a social cost which depends on
the size of the losses that are imposed on unsecured debt holders. We allow for this
possibility for two reasons. First, losses can be imposed on equity holders without
modifying the contract, whereas the imposition of losses on debt holders will require
a modification of the original debt contract. The process of modifying the debt
contract is likely to give rise to social deadweight costs, in the form of legal costs
and administrative costs for the resolution authority, which are likely to increase
with the amount of losses that need to be imposed and the number of creditors that
are affected as a result. Second, unlikely equity, debt will need to be rolled over.
For example, Avgouleas and Goodhart (2014) have raised the possibility that the
imposition of losses on unsecured debt holder in one bank could cause a dry-up of
the market for such unsecured bank debt, especially when the financial system is
already under stress. Thus, the possibility that a large-scale ‘bail-in’ of creditors of
a systemic bank might impose negative externalities on other banks in the form of
contagion cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, we also allow for the possibility that
the ‘bail out’ of depositors might give rise to a social cost which depends on the
size of losses imposed on the DIF: this captures the possibility that any DIF deficit
will need to be funded by distortionary taxes which create a deadweight loss. The
details of the model specification are described in Section 2.4.4, which examines how
the regulator should set the various requirements in order to maximise the social
benefits. The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
7For evidence of ‘gambling for resurrection’ during the 1990s Japanese banking crisis, see Peek
and Rosengren (2005) and Nelson and Tanaka (2014).
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Figure 2.1 – Timing of the model
2.4 Socially optimal regulatory requirements and
resolution
We now solve this model backwards in order to illustrate the determinants of the
socially optimal minimum capital requirement, regulatory capital buffer and TLAC
requirement. We demonstrate that ex-ante regulatory requirements determine the
share of insolvent banks in the bad state, as well as the size of the losses imposed
on different stakeholders of the bank – the shareholders, the unsecured debt holders
and the deposit insurance fund (DIF). Hence, the regulatory requirements will need
to be set by taking into account the possible social costs associated with imposing
losses on different stakeholders.
2.4.1 Optimal minimum capital requirement
At t = 1, the regulator optimally intervenes in the bank if its continuation without
intervention would result in asset substitution that could magnify the eventual losses
for creditors and the DIF, which also give rise to social costs. Thus, the optimal
minimum capital requirement is given by the capital ratio below which the bank’s
shareholders have an incentive to ‘gamble for resurrection’.
Since pγ < 1, a bank will always choose to reinvest in the safe asset if the macro
state is ‘good’ and the interim return is high:
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p [γRH − iθ(1− e0)− (1− θ)] < RH − iθ(1− e0)− (1− θ) (2.6)
Hence, there is no need for a regulatory intervention in a ‘good’ macro state when
banks receive a high return.
When the realised macro state is ‘bad’, some banks receiving very low returns may
have the incentive to invest in the risky asset if their interim returns are low, in order
to ’gamble for resurrection’. This ex post moral hazard arises because shareholders
are limitedly liable, and interest rate on long-term debt cannot adjust once debt has
been issued: thus, a bank which has received a low interim asset return can increase
expected returns for shareholders at the expense of debt holders by investing in
risky, negative NPV assets. More specifically, a bank has the incentive to ‘gamble
for resurrection’ if the expected return from investing the interim return in risky
asset is higher than that of investing in the safe asset:
p[γRL − iθ(1− e0)− (1− θ)] < max {RL − iθ(1− e0)− (1− θ), 0} (2.7)
Rearranging the above, we obtain that banks will gamble for resurrection in the
absence of any regulatory intervention if RL < R
T , where RT is defined as follows:
RT ≡ 1− p
1− pγ [(1− θ) + iθ(1− e0)] (2.8)
The investment in risky assets by a weakly capitalised bank ultimately magnifies
expected losses for its creditors and the DIF (and the associated social costs), thus
creating a rationale for an early intervention by the authorities to prevent asset
substitution when RL < R
T . It can be shown that some of these banks are still
solvent. By substituting RL = R
T from (2.8) into (2.5), we obtain the minimum
equity ratio below which the authorities need to intervene at t = 1 to prevent asset
substitution by the bank (see Annex):
E∗ =
p(γ − 1)
1− p (2.9)
We interpret E∗ as the optimal minimum regulatory capital requirement, or equiv-
alently in our model, the optimal trigger for resolution. If a bank’s capital ratio
falls below this level, then it has the incentive to engage in socially sub-optimal as-
set substitution, and this creates a case for an early intervention by the authorities
before the point of insolvency is reached.
2.4.2 Bail in and resolution
We assume that, if the bank is found to be in breach of the minimum capital re-
quirement (2.9) at t = 1, the regulator (or the resolution authority) will use the
following decision rule:
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Resolution Rule:
1. The resolution authority intervenes at t = 1 whenever the capital requirement
is breached, i.e. whenever (2.5) holds, where E∗ is defined by (2.9).
2. If there is sufficient amount of unsecured debt G that can be written down
to restore the bank’s capital ratio to E∗ or above, then write down unsecured
debt and let the bank continue operating as normal (‘bail in’).
3. If there is insufficient amount of unsecured debt that can be written down to
restore the bank’s capital ratio to E∗ or above, then wind down the bank. This
could, for example, include transferring all, or part of failed bank’s assets and
liabilities to another entity. In this case, the claimholders are compensated in
accordance with the claimholder hierarchy, i.e. the DIF is compensated first,
followed by the unsecured debt holders, and finally the equity holders.
Importantly, we assume that resolution does not destroy the value of the bank,
regardless of whether the bank is successfully recapitalised through bail in, or wound
down. Rather, resolution only prevents the asset substitution (or gambling for
resurrection) by an undercapitalised bank, and thus benefits the uninsured creditors
and the DIF relative to the counterfactual of no intervention. Thus, resolution is
value preserving, in the sense that it maximises the sum of the expected returns to
shareholders, unsecured debt holders, depositors and the DIF, although shareholders
are prevented from engaging in a profitable risk-shifting opportunity and hence are
made worse off. This simplifying assumption is made in order to capture the
‘no creditor worse off than liquidation’ principle for resolution, as outlined in the
FSB’s (2015) Principles. Thus, it is time-consistent for the regulator to follow the
Resolution Rule, as it minimises expected losses for unsecured debt holders and the
deposit insurance fund, and this is consistent with minimising the social cost of bank
failure. This point is explained more fully in Section 2.4.4.
This assumption implies that the unsecured debt holders will suffer losses only if
the bank is insolvent, and not just in breach of the minimum capital requirement
E∗, regardless of whether the bank is recapitalised or wound down, i.e.:
RL < (1− θ) + iθ(1− e0) ≡ RS (2.10)
Thus, if the bank is solvent at the point of resolution (i.e. RL ≥ RS), then the
unsecured debt holders receive their promised return iθ(1− e0) in full. If the bank
is insolvent, i.e. RL < R
S, the unsecured debt holders will only receive the residual
claim at wind down, given by max {RL − (1− θ), 0}. The unsecured debt holders
will receive nothing, although the depositors are compensated in full by the deposit
insurance full when RL < R
D where:
RD ≡ 1− θ (2.11)
The stakeholder payoffs and the allocation of the asset return RL in the bad state
are summarised in Table 2.1:
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Table 2.1 – Payoffs of the stakeholders in the bad state
RL ∈ (0, RD) RL ∈ (RD, RS) RL ∈ (RS , RT ) RL ∈ (RT , Rmax)
RA decision Resolve Resolve Resolve Don’t resolve
Stakeholder Payoffs
Shareholders 0 0
RL − iθ(1− e0)−
(1− θ)
RL − iθ(1− e0)−
(1− θ)
Unsecured debt
holders
0 RL − (1− θ) iθ(1− e0) iθ(1− e0)
Depositors (1− θ) (1− θ) (1− θ) (1− θ)
DIF RL − (1− θ) 0 0 0
2.4.3 The pricing of unsecured debt
The pricing of unsecured debt depends on the realisation of RL at the end of the
period t = 0, given the Resolution Rule as described above. Thus, the market
assumes that the resolution authority will intervene at t = 1 whenever the minimum
capital requirement is breached, and hence do not expect gambling for resurrection
to occur in equilibrium. We assume that the bail-in of unsecured debt is fully
credible, such that the credit risk is fully priced in the interest rate. Note that
there are three ex-post types of banks depending on the realised return RL:
1. 0 ≤ RL ≤ RD (Type 1: insolvent in the low state, with zero recovery value for
unsecured debt holders)
2. RD ≤ RL ≤ RS (Type 2: insolvent in the low state, with positive recovery
value for unsecured debt holders)
3. RS ≤ RL ≤ Rmax (Type 3: solvent in the low state)
Type 1 banks will be insolvent in the low state, and the return RL will be insufficient
to cover the liability to depositors. Thus, the unsecured debt holders of Type 1
banks are paid their promised return i if R = RH which occurs with probability q
and receive 0 with probability 1 − q. The unsecured debt holders need to earn the
expected return which is at least equal to the interest rate on the outside option
of storage. Thus, the equilibrium interest rate for Type 1 banks’ unsecured debt,
denoted as i1, is determined by the following equilibrium condition:
qi1θ(1− e0) + (1− q)0 = θ(1− e0) (2.12)
This yields the following interest rate which includes a risk premium to reflect the
fact that unsecured debt holders only get paid their promised i1θ(1− e0) with prob-
ability q.
i1 =
1
q
> 1 (2.13)
Thus, the expected profit of Type 1 banks at the end of period t = 0 (net of equity
holders’ opportunity cost of investing in the bank) is given by:
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Π1 = q(RH − (1− θ)− 1
q
θ(1− e0))− δθe0
= q [RH − (1− θ)]− θ(1− e0)− δθe0 (2.14)
The private opportunity cost of equity funding enters negatively in the profit func-
tion, as equity investors only care about returns in excess of this opportunity cost.
Note that the profits of Type 1 banks are distorted by the implicit subsidy from the
DIF, as losses will be borne by the DIF in the bad state. It can be shown that
∂Π1
∂e0
< 0 and ∂Π1
∂θ
< 0 as long as δ > 1, so Type 1 bank will issue no more equity
and unsecured debt than required by the regulator at t = 1. As the shareholders
of Type 1 banks capture positive profits in the good state while they at the most
lose all their initial investments in the bad state due to limited liability, they benefit
from the implicit subsidy from the deposit insurance fund.
Type 2 banks will also be insolvent in the low state, but the low return will be suffi-
cient to cover the liability to depositors, and the unsecured debt holders will receive
the residual claim in the low state. Thus, the equilibrium unsecured debt interest
rate for Type 2 banks, denoted as i2, is determined by the following condition:
qi2θ(1− e0) + (1− q)(RL − (1− θ)) = θ(1− e0) (2.15)
Thus, the interest rate on unsecured debt for Type 2 banks is given by:
i2 =
1
q
− 1− q
q
RL − (1− θ)
θ(1− e0) (2.16)
The expected profit of Type 2 banks is given by:
Π2 = q
(
RH − (1− θ)−
(
1
q
− 1− q
q
RL − (1− θ)
θ(1− e0)
)
θ(1− e0)
)
− δθe0
= qRH + (1− q)RL − (1− θe0)− δθe0 (2.17)
Note that, because all losses in the low state will be borne by equity and unsecured
debt holders who can fully price all risks, profits of Type 2 banks are not distorted
by the presence of an implicit subsidy from the DIF. Type 2 banks will also issue
as much equity and unsecured debt as required by the regulator, as ∂Π2
∂e0
< 0 and
∂Π2
∂θ
< 0.
Type 3 banks will be solvent in the low state, such that the low asset return RL
will be sufficiently high to pay both depositors D and the unsecured debt holders
their initial investment G in full, if the unsecured debt carries a risk free rate. This
implies that the unsecured debt of Type 3 banks carries a risk free rate, such that:
i3 = 1 (2.18)
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Thus, the expected profit of Type 3 banks is given by:
Π3 = q(RH − (1− θ)− θ(1− e0)) + (1− q)(RL − (1− θ)− θ(1− e0))− δθe0
= qRH + (1− q)RL − (1− θe0)− δθe0 (2.19)
As with type 2 banks, type 3 banks’ profits are not distorted by the implicit subsidy
from the DIF, as the losses are fully borne by equity holders. The expected profits
are simply the expected value of the asset minus the liabilities. Type 3 banks
will also issue as much equity and unsecured debt as required by the regulator, as
∂Π3
∂e0
< 0 and ∂Π3
∂θ
< 0.
Thus, for all banks, the capital buffer requirement (2.3) and TLAC requirement
(2.2) are binding, such that:
E0 − E∗ = θe0 − E∗ = Eb (2.20)
E∗ +G = E∗ + θ(1− e0) = τ ∗ (2.21)
The above results also imply that, if the minimum capital requirement (2.1) is
violated at t = 1, then the TLAC requirement (2.2) is also violated. Note that, the
sum of capital buffer and TLAC is equal to the private loss absorbing capacity, θ:
Eb + τ ∗ = θ
The above implies that the expected profit of a bank at the start of period t = 0 is
given by:
EΠ =
∫ 1−θ
0
{q [RH − (1− θ)]− θ(1− e0)} f(RL)dRL
+
∫ Rmax
1−θ
{qRH + (1− q)RL − (1− θe0)} f(RL)dRL − δθe0
2.4.4 Ex-ante social welfare
The capital buffer and TLAC requirements, Eb and τ ∗, will determine the share
of each type in the banking sector when the bad macro state – or a system-wide
stress – materialises ex-post. Thus, we now consider how these two regulatory
requirements are optimally set, when the optimal minimum capital requirement E∗
is determined by (2.9). In order to pin down interior solutions for Eb and τ ∗, we
make the following assumptions in writing the social welfare function:
Assumption 1 (loss-absorbing equity): Equity can absorb losses ex-post without
imposing a social cost.
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Assumption 2 (ex-post costly bail in): The imposition of losses on the hold-
ers of unsecured debt is associated with a social deadweight loss ψ(LG ,T ) that are
increasing and convex in the loss given default LG,T imposed on unsecured debt
holders of Type T bank in the bad state (where T ∈ {1, 2}), so that ψ(0) = 0,
ψ(LG,T ) ≥ 0 ∀LG,T > 0, ψ′(LG,T ) > 0, ψ′′(LG,T ) > 0.
Assumption 3 (ex-post costly bail out): The imposition of losses on the deposit
insurance fund (DIF) are associated with a social deadweight loss χ(LD,1) that is
increasing and convex with respect to the loss given default LD,1 imposed on the
DIF at resolution (for Type 1 banks), where χ(0) = 0, χ(LD,1) ≥ 0 ∀LD,1 > 0,
χ′(LD,1) > 0, and χ′′(LD,1) > 0.
Assumption 4 (value-preserving resolution): The resolution of a failing bank
will not destroy the recovery value of its assets, RL, which will be distributed
amongst the claimholders according to hierarchy. The resolution is triggered when-
ever E < E∗.
Assumption 4 implies that all of the bank’s asset returns are captured by a combina-
tion of its shareholders, the unsecured debt holders, and the DIF at resolution. This
assumption is made purely for expositional simplicity. We expect that dropping
this assumption would simply increase the optimal capital buffer by increasing the
cost of bail in and bail out. Assumptions 1-3 imply that the imposition of a given
loss on unsecured debt holders or the DIF is socially more costly than the imposition
similarly sized loss on equity holders, and that the social cost of a bank failure is
captured by the externalities caused by the bail in and bail out. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3, the externalities from bail-in (Assumption 2) could arise from the fact that,
while imposition of losses on equity holders can be done without modification of the
contract, imposition of losses on debt holders will require modification of the original
debt contract, which will be subject to legal and administrative costs. Moreover,
debt needs to be rolled over. Thus, there is a risk that the imposition of losses on
unsecured debt holders of one bank gives rise to ‘contagion externalities’ by raising
concerns about the solvency of other banks: this can create funding difficulties for
other banks that need to roll over their maturing unsecured debt. This possibility
is of particular concern when the market is already under stress and there is a gen-
eralised concern about the stability of the banking system as a whole. We assume
that the social deadweight loss from bail-in, ψ(LG ,T ), is convex, thus capturing the
possibility that, while a small scale bail in is done relatively easily without causing
contagion, large scale bail-in is more likely to create investor uncertainty across the
banking sector.
Assumption 3 implies that the imposition of losses on the DIF is also associated
with a social cost. We interpret this as a deadweight loss associated with funding
any deficit of the DIF via distortionary taxes. For completeness, however, we do
consider in Section 2.4.5 the cases in which Assumptions 2 and 3 are dropped.
Since capital buffer and TLAC requirements are binding, as in (2.20) and (2.21),
setting Eb and τ ∗ amounts to selecting the socially optimal θ and e0, subject to
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resolution occurring whenever the equity ratio falls below E∗ (given by (2.9)) at t =
1. Thus, the regulator sets these parameters to maximise the social welfare, denoted
as W, which is given by the expected return on investment of ex-ante identical banks
– which is equal to the sum of the expected payoffs of equity investors, uninsured
creditors, depositors and the deposit insurance fund – net of the social opportunity
cost of equity funding and the expected social costs of bail in and bail out (see
Annex for derivation):
W ≡ R¯− δsθe0 (2.22)
− (1− q)
(∫ RS(i=i3)
RD
ψ(LG,2)f(RL)dRL +
∫ RD
0
[ψ(LG,1) + χ(LD,1)] f(RL)dRL
)
where
R¯ ≡ qRH + (1− q)
∫ Rmax
0
RLf(RL)dRL
δs ≡ δ − 1
LG,1 ≡ i1θ(1− e0) (2.23)
LG,2 ≡ i2θ(1− e0)− [RL − (1− θ)] (2.24)
LD,1 ≡ (1− θ)−RL (2.25)
and, using (2.10), (2.18), the point of insolvency can be expressed as:
RS(i = i3) = (1− θ) + θ(1− e0) = 1− θe0 (2.26)
As explained in Section 2.3.1, δs in (2.22) reflects the social opportunity cost of
equity funding, which captures the higher (deadweight) transaction. The derivation
of the social welfare function (2.22) is in the Annex.
It is worth clarifying at this point what the social costs and benefits of increasing
the capital buffer are in our model. In our model, increasing the capital buffer
reduces both the probability of a bank failure (by lowering the point of insolvency,
(2.26)) and the cost of a bank failure (by lowering the losses imposed on unsecured
debt holders, (2.23) and (2.24)). But this comes at the cost of reducing output by
‘crowding out’ investments in other sectors that banks’ equity investors could have
funded instead. Note that, in the absence of social deadweight costs associated with
bank failures (ψ(.) = 0 and χ(.) = 0), the regulator simply maximises the expected
total return of the bank – which will be shared amongst all claimholders – net of
the social cost of equity funding.
2.4.5 Determinants of optimal regulatory requirements
We now examine the key determinants of the socially optimal capital buffer Eb
and TLAC requirement τ ∗, given the optimal minimum requirement E∗ given by
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(2.9), through numerical simulations of (2.9) and (2.22). To do this, we assume the
following quadratic functional forms for the social costs of bail in and bail out:
ψ(LG ,T ) = λGLG,T + λ˜GL
2
G,T
χ(LD,T ) = λDLD,T + λ˜DL
2
D,T
The derivation of the social welfare function under these assumptions is provided in
the Annex. Under the baseline calibration, we assume the following: p = 0.3, γ =
1.14, RH = 2, R
max = 1.045, δs = 0.0025, λG = 0.02, λ˜G = 0.0256, λD = 0.023, λ˜D =
0.0089, q = 0.9. The baseline parameterisations are chosen purely to reproduce the
minimum TLAC, minimum capital and capital buffer requirements as set out by
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS). As these parameters are not chosen based on empirical estimates, we
are primarily interested in the directional (rather than quantitative) change in the
optimal trio of regulatory requirements caused by the changes in the assumptions
about the key parameters. But we note that the baseline parameterisations reflect
the view that the social cost of equity funding is small, and that the cost of bail-in is
smaller than the cost of bail-out as long as the size of loss at insolvency is relatively
small.
The tables below summarise the results from numerical simulation. The third col-
umn of Table 2.2 below shows the optimal regulatory requirements under the baseline
calibration: in this scenario, we obtain an optimal minimum capital requirement of
6.0% (consistent with Basel III end-point Tier 1 capital ratio), capital buffer of 5.0%
(consistent with Basel III end-point capital conservation buffer of 2.5% plus G-SIB
buffer of 1-2.5%), and TLAC of 18.0% (consistent with the full implementation of
the FSB (2015)’s Principles in 2022).
A key unknown parameter is the cost of bail-in, given that there is little historical
precedents for orderly imposition of losses on private bond holders of large banks.
In the fourth column of Table 2.2, we present the ’low bail in cost’ scenario, in which
λ˜G = 0.02: i.e. the bail-in cost is both lower and less convex than in the baseline.
The optimal equity buffer falls in this case to 4%, while the optimal TLAC rises
to 25%. This is because in this scenario, bail-in is lower cost than bail-out, and
unsecured debt is a close substitute to equity in its ability to absorb losses without
creating large externalities. Conversely, a higher and more convex bail-in cost
(λ˜G = 0.03, shown in the fifth column of Table 2.2) would imply a lower optimal
TLAC and a higher capital buffer than the baseline. Note that the minimum capital
requirement is invariant to the cost of bail-in, as this is determined by the need to
ensure that the bank has enough ’skin in the game’ to incentivise it to invest in the
safe asset.
Bailout costs also matter. In the ’low bailout cost’ scenario presented in column 4
of Table 2.3 (in which λ˜D = 0.008), both the capital buffer and TLAC are lower than
the baseline (shown in column 3). Conversely, in the ’high bailout cost’ scenario
(shown in column 5) in which λ˜D = 0.0095, so that bailout costs are both higher and
more convex, both the capital buffer and TLAC can be considerably higher relative
to the baseline.
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Table 2.2 – Optimal regulation and sensitivity to bail-in costs
Expression Baseline Low bailin cost High bailin cost
Minimum Capi-
tal Ratio
E∗ 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
TLAC τ∗ 18.0% 21.0% 16.5%
Capital buffer Eb 5.0% 4.0% 5.6%
Minimum TLAC
+ Capital Buffer
θ 23.0% 25.0% 22.0%
Table 2.3 – Optimal regulation and sensitivity to bail-out costs
Expression Baseline Low bailout cost High bailout cost
Minimum Capi-
tal Ratio
E∗ 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
TLAC τ ∗ 18.0% 17.2% 18.6%
Capital buffer Eb 5.0% 3.8% 5.9%
Minimum TLAC
+ Capital Buffer
θ 23.0% 21.0% 24.5%
There are also other important parameters that determine the optimal regulatory
ratios, as shown in Table 2.4. For example, a higher social cost of equity (δs =
0.00255) would imply that the regulator should require banks to hold a lower capital
buffer than the baseline (column 3 in Table 2.4). Interestingly, stronger incentives
for failing banks to engage in gambling, or asset substitution (γ = 1.15, shown
in column 4 in Table 2.4) implies that the regulator should set a higher minimum
capital requirement, but also a lower capital buffer and a higher TLAC requirement,
so as to maintain the sum of TLAC and capital buffer (θ) the same as in the baseline:
this is intuitive, as the cost of insolvency is unchanged from the baseline, while the
need for early intervention has increased. Finally, if the probability of adverse macro
shock becomes higher (q = 0.895, column 5 in Table 2.4), then the capital buffer
should be increased while the TLAC requirement can be reduced. This reflects
the higher expected social cost of bank failure, which calls for a higher capital and
lower unsecured debt to reduce the probability of bank failure. This analysis raises
an interesting possibility that, as the capital buffer is raised with increased risk of
system wide distress, the TLAC requirement may actually need to be reduced to
allow banks to fund themselves with more capital and less debt.
For completeness, we also examine the extreme case in which both bail-out and
bail-in are costless (λD = λG = 0 and λ˜D = λ˜G = 0): thus, our Assumptions 2 and
3 are dropped, and both deposits and debt become perfect substitutes to equity
as loss-absorbing instruments. In this case, while a minimum capital requirement
E∗ is still needed in order to prevent ex-post moral hazard, and there is no need
for a capital buffer or TLAC requirement in this case. In the next section, we
demonstrate that, when ex-ante moral hazard is present, then the regulator should
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Table 2.4 – Optimal regulation under different scenarios
Baseline High equity cost Strong gambling incentive Higher macro risk
Minimum Capi-
tal Ratio
6.0% 6.0% 6.4% 6.0%
Subordinated
debt
12.0% 12.1% 12.0% 11.3%
TLAC 18.0% 18.1% 18.4% 17.3%
Capital buffer 5.0% 3.4% 4.6% 8.7%
Minimum TLAC
+ Capital Buffer
23.0% 21.5% 23.0% 26.0%
still require that the bank has sufficient private loss absorbing capacity, θ.
We also study what happens if only Assumption 2 is dropped. Suppose that bail-in
is costless (λG = λ˜G = 0) but bail-out remains costly (as in the baseline). In this
case, it is optimal to require banks to meet a TLAC requirement of 100% and a
minimum capital requirement of E∗ (=6% as in the baseline), but there will be no
need for a capital buffer. This is intuitive: if bail-in is costless, then unsecured
debt and equity are perfect substitutes ex-post as loss absorbing instruments, and
hence unsecured debt is favoured over equity as the latter is socially more costly ex-
ante. Deposits are socially less desirable than unsecured debt in this case. We note,
however, that deposits may carry benefits that are not considered in this model, such
as the convenience of on-demand withdrawal, such that a 100% TLAC requirement
may not be desirable even when bail-in is costless. Finally, we note that, when
δs = 0, our model suggests that bank should be fully funded by equity.
2.5 Ex-ante moral hazard and the impact of reg-
ulatory policies
Thus far, we have assumed that the probability of a high return, q, is exogenous. In
this section, we assume that q is determined endogenously by banks’ decisions over
the monitoring of their projects, which requires them to exert costly effort. We
then examine how ex-ante regulation affects the incentive to monitor.
Suppose that, in the absence of any monitoring by banks at t = 0, the probability
of the project yielding high return is qL. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
suppose that, if banks choose to exert a monitoring effort which has private cost C,
they can increase the probability of project success from qL to qH , where qH > qL.
We assume that the bank chooses the monitoring effort at the end of t = 0, after
the realisation of RL has been observed. At this point there is no information
asymmetry between banks and potential unsecured debt holders, so the market can
fully price in the risk depending on whether or not the bank monitors its investment
at t=0.
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2.5.1 Socially efficient monitoring
Monitoring is socially efficient for Type 1 banks with RL ∈ (0, RD), if the following
condition holds:
qHRH + (1− qH) [RL − ψ(LG,1)− χ(LD,1)]− C ≥
qLRH + (1− qL) [RL − ψ(LG,1)− χ(LD,1)] , ∀RL ∈ (0, RD)
In other words, the private monitoring cost C incurred by the banks must be suf-
ficiently small relative to the social costs of bail in and bail out. This can be
simplified to:
C ≤ C∗1 ≡ (qH−qL)(RH−RL)+(qH−qL)[ψ(LG,1)+χ(LD,1)], ∀RL ∈ (0, RD) (2.27)
The right hand side is the sum of the benefits from monitoring that accrue to
banks’ claimholders, (qH − qL)(RH −RL), and to the society in the form of reduced
externalities from bail ins and bail outs, (qH − qL)[ψ(LG,1) + χ(LD,1)].
Similarly, monitoring is efficient for Type 2 banks with RL ∈ (RD, RS), as long as:
qHRH+(1−qH) [RL − ψ(LG,2)]−C ≥ qLRH+(1−qL) [RL − ψ(LG,2)] , ∀RL ∈ (RD, RS)
This can be reorganised as:
C ≤ C∗2 ≡ (qH − qL)(RH −RL) + (qH − qL)ψ(LG,2), ∀RL ∈ (RD, RS) (2.28)
Finally, monitoring is efficient for Type 3 banks with RL ∈ (RS, Rmax), as long as:
qHRH + (1− qH)RL − C ≥ qLRH + (1− qL)RL, ∀RL ∈ (RS, Rmax)
This can be reorganised as:
C ≤ C∗3 ≡ (qH − qL)(RH −RL), ∀RL ∈ (RS, Rmax) (2.29)
In what follows, we assume that C ≤ C∗1 , C ≤ C∗2 , and C ≤ C∗3 for all Types 1,
2, and 3 banks, respectively. In other words, the regulator would always want to
ensure that banks monitor their projects.
2.5.2 Private monitoring incentives
We now consider the monitoring incentives of a bank which seeks to maximise share-
holder returns in a context in which monitoring is socially desirable. From previous
analysis in Section 2.4.3, we know that profits of Type 1 banks are distorted by the
presence of implicit subsidy from the DIF. Below, we demonstrate that only Type
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1 banks are therefore prone to ex-ante moral hazard; and that having a sufficiently
high private loss absorbing capacity, θ, which is the sum of TLAC plus equity buffer,
can help reduce this.
For Type 1 banks with RL ∈ (0, RD), unsecured debt has zero recovery value if
R = RL. From (2.13), we know that the interest rate on unsecured debt is
1
qH
if
the bank chooses to monitor, and 1
qL
if it decides not to monitor, such that 1
qH
< 1
qL
.
Type 1 banks will monitor as long as the expected profit from monitoring, net of
monitoring costs, exceed the expected profit of not monitoring:
Π1(qH)− C > Π1(qL)
where Π1(.) is given by (2.14). Reorganising the above, we can show that Type 1
banks will monitor their projects as long as θ ≥ θ∗ where:
θ∗ =
C
qH − qL −RH + 1 (2.30)
This shows that, unless θ is sufficiently high, Type 1 banks will be subject to moral
hazard and will not monitor their project. Thus, the regulator can ensure that Type
1 banks take actions to reduce risks by setting θ – TLAC plus equity buffer – above
θ∗. We emphasise that the incentive to engage in moral hazard is influenced by the
total amount of losses that can be absorbed by private claimholders as opposed to
taxpayers. In particular, the monitoring incentives are unaffected by the split of θ
between equity and unsecured debt, as unsecured debt prices in the risks that banks
are taking. Thus, as long as θ is sufficiently high, distortions in monitoring effort
arising from a limitedly liable bank being funded by insured deposits is eliminated.8
For instance, for baseline parameterisations C = 0.45, qH = 0.9, qL = 0.5 and RH =
2, θ ≥ θ∗ =12.5% is needed to induce monitoring by Type 1 banks. But if there
is an exogenous shock that reduces the probability of a high return that banks can
achieve through monitoring, θ will need to be raised in order to induce monitoring:
for instance, for qH = 0.89, θ ≥ θ∗ =15.4% is needed to induce monitoring by Type
1 banks, consistent with our previous analysis. Note that the optimal θ – which
maximises social welfare (2.22) – could be higher than the minimum required to
induce monitoring by Type 1 banks.
For Type 2 banks with RL ∈ (RD, RS) and Type 3 banks RL ∈ (RS, Rmax), we have
already seen that their profits are not distorted by the presence of the guarantee
on deposits, because the DIF will not have to pay out anything even in the bad
scenario. Type 2 banks will monitor as long as:
Π2(qH)− C > Π2(qL)
where Π2(.) is given by (2.17). Similarly, Type 3 banks with RL ∈ (RS, Rmax) will
monitor as long as:
8Or equivalently the distortion created from risk-insensitive interest rates on insured deposits
is sufficiently small.
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Π3(qH)− C > Π3(qL)
where Π3(.) is given by (2.19). Reorganising the above, it can be shown that both
Type 2 and Type 3 banks will choose to monitor as long as:
C < (qH − qL)(RH −RL)
The right hand side is the benefits of monitoring that accrue to the banks’ claimhold-
ers. Comparing the above with (2.28) and (2.29), it is clear that Type 3 have the
socially optimal incentive to monitor, regardless of the level of θ. This is because
Type 3 banks will remain solvent even in the bad state, so that all costs and benefits
are internalised. By contrast, Type 2 banks have a sub-optimal incentive to moni-
tor, if (qH−qL)(RH−RL) < C < C∗2 : if so, Type 2 banks do not have the incentive to
monitor, because the private cost of monitoring outweighs the benefit, even though
it is socially optimal for them to monitor once the cost of bail in is taken into consid-
eration. Note that Type 2 banks’ incentive to monitor is independent of θ, because
they will not impose losses on the DIF even in the bad state and hence are not sub-
ject to moral hazard driven by the implicit subsidy. This is why ex-ante regulatory
requirements cannot induce them to monitor, if (qH − qL)(RH −RL) < C < C∗2 .
2.6 Conclusion
The interactions between the new regulatory requirements on banks, which were in-
troduced after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, is still a relatively unexplored
area. In this context, our paper makes two key contributions. First, we clarify
within a simple framework what factors determine the optimal settings of the trio
of regulatory requirements: the minimum capital requirement, the TLAC require-
ment, and the capital buffer. Second, we show which of the trio of the regulatory
requirements should be adjusted cyclically.
Our analysis illustrates that the optimal size of the capital buffer and TLAC, and
the optimal composition of TLAC, depend on the social cost of a crisis (i.e. the
cost of bail-in and bail-out), as well as the probability of a system-wide shock.
This implies that the policymakers will need to take a view on how costly they
expect bail-in – which is yet to be tested – to be. If they expect system-wide
externalities from bail-in to be limited, then setting a low capital buffer and a high
TLAC requirement would be optimal, when equity funding is socially expensive.
By contrast, if policymakers fear that bail-in could potentially cause contagion,
or would be subject to high legal costs, then a relatively low TLAC requirement
and a high capital buffer would be desirable. We note that the cost of bail-in
is fundamentally uncertain, given that it is untested and hence there is a lack of
evidence to enable us to estimate the cost. Thus, a precautionary approach might
suggest that a relatively low TLAC requirement combined with a high capital buffer
might be desirable, especially if the social cost of equity is considered to be relatively
small.
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Our analysis also raises an interesting possibility that it may be desirable to make
TLAC as well as capital buffer time-varying: in particular, as the risk of system-wide
shock increases, the capital buffer should be raised and TLAC should be reduced in
order to reduce the probability of bank insolvency. This result could alternatively
interpreted as stating that forbearance on the minimum TLAC requirement could be
justifiable if the bank in question is well capitalised, and that such a policy may not
give rise to the same adverse incentives associated with forbearance on the minimum
capital requirement.
Chapter John Vourdas 49
Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 1
A.1 Equilibrium Deposit Contract
The Lagrangian is given by expression (A.1).
L = (yj +R(1− yj)− λcj1 − (1− λ)cj2)(uj − ukd + 1N
)
(A.1)
+ µ1(y
j − λcj1) + µ2(R(1− yj − (1− λ)cj2) + µ3
(
cj2 − cj1
)
The first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to holding of the short asset, con-
sumption in periods 1 and 2 (y, c1 and c2, µ1 and µ2 respectively) are below
µ1 −Rµ2 = 1
N
(R− 1) (A.2)
µ1 =
1
d
u′(c1) [y +R(1− y)− λc1 − (1− λ)c2]− 1
N
(A.3)
µ2 =
1
d
u′(c2) [y +R(1− y)− λc1 − (1− λ)c2]− 1
N
(A.4)
min {y − λc1, µ1} = 0 (A.5)
min{R(1− y)− (1− λ)c2, µ2} = 0 (A.6)
min{cj2 − cj1, µ3} = 0 (A.7)
Where the above simplified FOCs make use of the fact that in a symmetric equi-
librium all banks give the same deposit contract yielding the same utility i.e. uj =
uk = u. Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) in (A.2) the following expression is obtained:
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[u′(c1)−Ru′(c2)] [y +R(1− y)− λc1 − (1− λ)c2] = 0 (A.8)
This implies that at least one of the bracketed terms in (A.8) equals zero. The first
bracketed term is an Euler equation and the latter bracketed term is the zero profit
condition. Note that if the bank makes zero profits both Lagrange multipliers are
strictly positive µ1 > 0, µ2 > 0 as the period 1 and 2 budget constraints are binding.
Substituting the zero profit condition into (A.3) and (A.4) gives µ1 = µ2 = −1/N
which contradicts with (A.5) and (A.6). Thus the above FOC can simplified to the
following expression.
u′(c1) = Ru′(c2) (A.9)
As the return on the long asset is greater than the return on the short asset banks
will only hold as much short asset as required to provide c1 to early depositors. Thus
(1.5) is binding, and (1.6) is non-binding, implying that µ1 > 0, µ2 = 0 so that the
following expression holds.
c1 =
y
λ
(A.10)
Substituting these conditions in (A.4) we obtain the following expression:
u′(c2)[R(1− y)− (1− λ)c2] = d
N
(A.11)
Using the specific example of the logarithmic utility function u(c) = ln(c) the ex-
pression becomes:
R(1− y)
c2
− (1− λ) = d
N
(A.12)
which yields the expression for c2
c2 =
R(1− y)
(1− λ) + d
N
(A.13)
So as the number of banks becomes large (N → ∞) or the banks become less
horizontally differentiated (d → 0) then the late consumption approaches the 1st
best outcome, as in AG (c2 → R(1−y)1−λ ) implying that profits tend to zero also.
Using (A.10) and (A.13) in the Euler equation and re-arranging we obtain the so-
lution to the above maximisation problem. Formally, these are the symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategies of all banks within the system.
(c∗1, c
∗
2, x
∗, y∗, µ∗1, µ
∗
2, µ
∗
3) =
(
N
N + d
,
RN
N + d
,
N +Nd−Nλ
N + d
,
λN
N + d
,
R− 1
N
, 0, 0
)
(A.14)
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A.2 Comparative Statics
In order to understand how the degree of competition and concentration we rear-
range the expression in condition to obtain the following contagion condition, which
can be expressed as a function of the number of firms N and the intensity of com-
petition d.
Ψ(N, d) = b− z(c1 − q1) ≥ 0 (A.15)
If the liquidation value of the long asset is small (r → 0) then the buffer b is given
by b = Π/l, meaning that expression (A.15) can be rewritten as the following, where
ρ = λH − λ.
Ψ(N, d) =
1
N2 +Nd
(
Rd
l
− 2ρ(1− λ)N
1 + ρ
)
(A.16)
The marginal effect of reducing the intensity of competition, i.e. increasing the
transport cost parameter d, is given by equation (A.17). Both bracketed terms
in the parentheses are strictly positive so the effect of increasing competition (a
reduction in d) reduces the buffer remaining, meaning that increased competition
ceteris paribus increases the parameter space in which contagion occurs.
∂Ψ
∂d
=
1
(N2 +Nd)2
(
Rd
l
+
2ρ(1− λ)
1 + ρ
)
(A.17)
The marginal effect of reducing concentration, i.e. increasing the number of banks
N , is given by equation (A.18). The sign of expression (A.18) is ambiguous. The first
term in the parentheses is strictly positive and the second term is strictly negative.
The first term is the concentration-risk effect, which results from an increase in
the number of banks reducing the losses from a single counterpart in the interbank
deposit network failing. The second term is the profit buffer effect, which results
from an increase in the number of banks reducing the profit buffer which banks can
use to absorb losses.
∂Ψ
∂N
=
1
(N2 +Nd)2
(
2ρ(1− λ)N2
1 + ρ
− Rd
l
(2N + d)
)
(A.18)
Which of the two effects dominates depends on whether the first term in the paren-
theses is larger in magnitude than the second term in parentheses. Rearranging
equation (dpsidN) we obtain the following condition which must be satisfied for
there to be concentration stability.
Rd
l
(2N + d) >
2ρ(1− λ)
1 + ρ
N2 (A.19)
From the above expression it can be deduced that concentration promotes systemic
stability (given an initial bank failure) if the return on the long asset R is high,
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competition is weak (d is high), the share of early customers λ is high, the interest
rate on the external loan l is low, and the difference in liquidity demands in states
1 and 2 (ρ) is low as this determine the breadth of the channel of contagion. A
narrower channel of contagion means that the concentration risk reducing effect of
increased number of banks N is reduced.
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B.1 Minimum Capital Requirement
The minimum capital requirement is obtained by substituting the gambling thresh-
old RL = R
T from(2.8) into (2.5). Rearranging (2.5) we obtain RL =
1−θ+iθ(1−e0)
1−E∗ .
Thus the minimum capital requirement E∗ solves the following condition:
1− θ + iθ(1− e0)
1− E∗ =
1− p
1− pγ [(1− θ) + iθ(1− e0)] (B.1)
which becomes
1− E∗ = 1− pγ
1− p
Rearranging the above, we obtain (2.9).
B.1.1 Derivation of the social welfare function
To derive (2.22), note that the social welfare consists of two components: i) the ex-
pected return from banks’ investment (which are divided between their claimholders)
net of the social opportunity cost of funding that investment, and ii) the expected
social cost of bank failure. The first component in the social welfare function is
given by the following expression.
Expected return on investment net of funding cost = R¯− (1− θ)− θ(1− e0)− δθe0
= R¯− 1− (δ − 1)θe0
= R¯− δsθe0 − 1 (B.2)
where R¯ ≡ qRH + (1 − q)
∫ Rmax
0
RLf(RL)dRL is the expected return on banks’
investment (which is the sum of the expected payoffs of the bank’s shareholders,
uninsured creditors, depositors and the deposit insurance fund), and δs ≡ δ − 1
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is the social opportunity cost of funding the bank with equity instead of debt or
deposits.
The second part of the social welfare function is given by the expected cost of bank
failure, which arises in a bad state when the bank becomes insolvent:
Expected social cost = −(1− q)
(∫ RS(i=i3)
RD
ψ(LG,2)f(RL)dRL
+
∫ RD
0
[ψ(LG,1) + χ(LD,1)] f(RL)dRL
)
(B.3)
where losses imposed on uninsured debt holders and depositors of Type 1 and Type
2 banks are given by:
LG,1 ≡ i1θ(1− e0)
LG,2 ≡ i2θ(1− e0)− [RL − (1− θ)]
LD,1 ≡ (1− θ)−RL
and, using (2.10), (2.18), the point of insolvency can be expressed as:
RS(i = i3) = (1− θ) + θ(1− e0) = 1− θe0
Summing up (B.2) and (B.3) after dr opping the constant −1, we obtain (2.22).
B.2 Social welfare function used for numerical sim-
ulation
We now derive the specific functional form of the welfare function (2.22), under the
following two assumptions.
ψ(LG ,T ) = λGLG,T + λ˜GL
2
G,T
χ(LD,1) = λDLD,T + λ˜DL
2
D,T
In this case, (2.22) can be rewritten in the following form:
W = R¯− (X + X˜)− (Y + Y˜ )− δsθe0 (B.4)
where:
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X = (1− q)λG
∫ 1−θe0
1−θ
LG,2f (RL) dRL
X˜ = (1− q)λ˜G
∫ 1−θe0
1−θ
L2G,2f (RL) dRL
Y = (1− q)
∫ 1−θ
0
(λGLG,1 + λDLD,1) f (RL)
Y˜ = (1− q)
∫ 1−θ
0
(
λ˜GL
2
G,1
)
f (RL)
Expanding the above:
R¯ = qRH + (1− q)
∫ Rmax
0
RLf(RL)dRL
= qRH + (1− q)R
max
2
The losses suffered by unsecured debt holders of Type 1 and 2 banks in the event of
insolvency are given by:
LG,1 = i1θ(1− e0) = θ(1− e0)
q
LG,2 = i2θ(1− e0)− (RL − (1− θ))
=
(
1
q
− 1− q
q
RL − (1− θ)
θ(1− e0)
)
θ(1− e0)− (RL − (1− θ))
=
1
q
(1− θe0 −RL)
Substituting the above:
X =
(1− q)λG
qRmax
∫ 1−θe0
1−θ
[(1− θe0 −RL)] dRL
=
(1− q)λG
qRmax
[
[(1− θe0)RL]1−θe01−θ −
[
R2L
2
]1−θe0
1−θ
]
=
(1− q)λG
qRmax
[
(1− θe0) ((1− θe0)− (1− θ))− 1
2
[
(1− θe0)2 − (1− θ)2
]]
=
(1− q)λG
qRmax
[
θ (1− θe) (1− e0)− 1
2
[
(1− θe0)2 − (1− θ)2
]]
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X˜ =
(1− q)λ˜G
Rmax
∫ 1−θe0
1−θ
(
1
q
(1− θe0 −RL)
)2
dRL
=
(1− q)λ˜G
q2Rmax
∫ 1−θe0
1−θ
[
(1− θe0)2 − 2RL(1− θe0) +R2L
]
dRL
=
(1− q)λ˜G
q2Rmax
[
(1− θe0)2[(1− θe0)− (1− θ)]− (1− θe0)[(1− θe0)2 − (1− θ)2] + [(1− θe0)
3 − (1− θ)3]
3
]
=
(1− q)λ˜G
q2Rmax
[
θ(1− θe0)(1− θ)(e0 − 1) + [(1− θe0)
3 − (1− θ)3]
3
]
Y = (1− q)
∫ 1−θ
0
[
λG
θ(1− e0)
q
+ λD ((1− θ)−RL)
]
f (RL) dRL
=
(1− q)
Rmax
[(
λG
θ(1− e0)
q
+ λD(1− θ)
)
RL
]1−θ
0
− (1− q)λD
Rmax
[
R2L
2
]1−θ
0
=
(1− q)
Rmax
[(
λG
θ(1− e0)
q
+ λD(1− θ)
)
(1− θ)− λD (1− θ)
2
2
]
=
(1− q)
Rmax
[(
λG
θ(1− θ)(1− e0)
q
)
+ λD
(1− θ)2
2
]
Y˜ =
(1− q)
Rmax
∫ 1−θ
0
[
λ˜G
(
θ(1− e0)
q
)2]
dRL
=
(1− q)λ˜G
Rmax
(
θ(1− e0)
q
)2
(1− θ)
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